Witold J. Henisz

ORCID: 0000-0003-2652-7401
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About
Contact & Profiles
Research Areas
  • International Business and FDI
  • Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
  • Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
  • Management and Organizational Studies
  • International Development and Aid
  • Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
  • Global trade and economics
  • Innovation and Knowledge Management
  • Public-Private Partnership Projects
  • State Capitalism and Financial Governance
  • ICT Impact and Policies
  • Construction Project Management and Performance
  • Environmental Sustainability in Business
  • Global Financial Crisis and Policies
  • Corruption and Economic Development
  • Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
  • Economic Theory and Policy
  • Social Capital and Networks
  • International Arbitration and Investment Law
  • Local Government Finance and Decentralization
  • Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering
  • Private Equity and Venture Capital
  • Economic Policies and Impacts
  • Public Relations and Crisis Communication

California University of Pennsylvania
2013-2024

University of Pennsylvania
2012-2024

Philadelphia University
2004-2024

Deloitte (United States)
2012-2019

Stanford University
2010

Council of Science Editors
2009

Carnegie Hall
2006

Georgetown University
2005

William P. Wharton Trust
2003

This article forges an explicit link between objective measure of political constraints and variation in cross‐national growth rates. It derives a new from simple spatial model interaction that incorporates information on the number independent branches government with veto power distribution preferences across within those branches. The derived variable is found to have statistically economically significant impact rates using ordinary least squares, three‐stage squares generalized method...

10.1111/1468-0343.00066 article EN Economics and Politics 2000-03-01

This article posits that the effect of political hazards on choice market entry mode varies across multinational firms based extent to which they face expropriation from their potential joint-venture partners in host country (the level contractual hazards). As increase, faces an increasing threat opportunistic by government. Partnering with host-country possess a comparative advantage interactions government can safeguard against this hazard. However, as benefit partner manipulating system...

10.1093/jleo/16.2.334 article EN The Journal of Law Economics and Organization 2000-10-01

The empirical evidence that links political institutions to economic outcomes has grown dramatically in recent years. However, virtually all of this analysis is undertaken using data from the past three decades. This paper extends framework by performing a two‐century long historical determinants infrastructure investment panel over 100 countries. results demonstrate environments limit feasibility policy change are an important determinant infrastructure.

10.1093/icc/11.2.355 article EN Industrial and Corporate Change 2002-04-01

In a study of sample 2,705 international plant location decisions by listed Japanese multinational corporations across possible set 155 countries in the 1990-1996 period, we use neoinstitutional theory and research on political institutions to explain organizational entry into new geographic markets. We extend theory's proposition that prior actions other organizations provide legitimization information decision marked uncertainty, showing this effect holds when uncertainty comes from firm's...

10.2307/3094871 article EN Administrative Science Quarterly 2001-09-01

Abstract We find support for the role of experiential learning in international expansion process by extending stages model internationalization to incorporate a sophisticated consideration temporal and cross‐national variation credibility policy environment. Using sample 3857 expansions 665 Japanese manufacturing firms, we build on concepts uncertainty learning, show that firms had gathered relevant types experience were less sensitive deterring effect uncertain environments investment. One...

10.1002/smj.355 article EN Strategic Management Journal 2003-09-24

This study jointly examines the effects of organizational capabilities and public private expropriation hazards on level equity ownership chosen for foreign subsidiaries in emerging mark...

10.2307/1556397 article EN Academy of Management Journal 2000-06-01

Why do countries differ so much in the extent to which they adopt neoliberal, marketoriented reform their infrastructure industries? Building on world-society and neoinstitutional theories sociology, this paper argues that international pressures of coercion, normative emulation, competitive mimicry strongly influence domestic adoption market-oriented reform. The considers effect such four elements: privatization state-owned firms, formal separation regulatory authority from executive...

10.1177/000312240507000601 article EN American Sociological Review 2005-12-01

We provide direct empirical evidence in support of instrumental stakeholder theory's argument that increasing enhances the financial valuation a firm, holding constant objective physical assets under its control. undertake this analysis using panel data on 26 gold mines owned by 19 publicly traded firms over period 1993–2008. code 50,000 events from media reports to develop an index degree conflict/cooperation for these mines. By incorporating market capitalization analysis, we reduce...

10.1002/smj.2180 article EN Strategic Management Journal 2013-08-22

We offer a simple model of policy making, emphasizing socialization and limits on human cognition to explicate mechanisms change in emergent (as opposed established) institutions. Emergent institutions are more susceptible change, their opponents may use frames or existing reference points illustrate inconsistency with prevailing notions legitimacy. Broader institutional structures specific organizational characteristics moderate pressure for change. This perspective has novel implications...

10.5465/amr.2005.16387892 article EN Academy of Management Review 2005-04-01

10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400031 article EN Journal of International Business Studies 2003-05-01

This paper explores the implications of going beyond transaction cost theory's implicit focus on domestic investors to include multinational actors. As developed herein, discriminating alignment between level hazards (contractual and/or political) and mode governance carries over. In open-economy context, such an reflects that arise from nature those political regulatory environment.

10.1515/bap.1999.1.3.261 article EN Business and Politics 1999-11-01

Checks and balances that limit the discretion of policy‐makers reduce volatility government expenditure revenue. While this assumption is at heart a large body empirical work, association between political institutions policy has itself been focus only limited testing. The results presented here support existence link, allow for comparison two prominent measures checks provide insight into relative impact on nine different types fiscal both during times macroeconomic stability upheaval.

10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00129.x article EN Economics and Politics 2004-02-03

This paper demonstrates that a structurally derived, internationally comparable index of checks and balances on executive discretion created by variation in political structures party systems affects relative rates basic telecommunications infrastructure deployment 147 countries during the period 1960–1994. Models investment omit characteristics prospective host country confound whose economic demographic point to rapid demand growth for services with those create potential trap investors...

10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00123.x article EN Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 2001-03-01

10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400015 article EN Journal of International Business Studies 2003-03-01

Some theories of foreign economic policy stress the importance domestic interest groups, whereas others focus on effects institutions. Debates between advocates these approaches are longstanding, but little systematic empirical research has been brought to bear relative merits theories. We argue that while group demands and institutions often regarded as having independent competing effects, it is more fruitful view influence each type factor conditional other. As explanations emphasizing...

10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00398.x article EN International Studies Quarterly 2006-03-01

10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400381 article EN Journal of International Business Studies 2008-05-19

Large, global, cross-sectoral, multi-phased civil infrastructure projects tend to be one-off for which transactions have no strong 'shadow of the future', but where elements relational contracting are still ubiquitous.Such evolve through discrete phases-financial and technical feasibility, conceptual design, detailed construction, operations renovation/replacement-each phase can viewed as a transaction during key participants stakeholders rotate in out project.This discontinuity...

10.1080/21573727.2011.637552 article EN Engineering Project Organization Journal 2012-01-24

This paper examines when and how a critical mass of social political stakeholders mobilizes against corporate organization the impact such mobilization on organization’s market value. Our study employs dataset more than 51,000 media-reported events describing interactions among almost 2,300 political, social, economic 19 gold-mining firms trading Toronto Stock Exchange operating mines in emerging markets around world. We first examine conditions dynamics that explain whether an isolated,...

10.1177/0001839216687743 article EN Administrative Science Quarterly 2017-01-09

This publication contains reprint articles for which IEEE does not hold copyright. Full text is available on Xplore these articles.

10.1109/emr.2014.6823807 article EN IEEE Engineering Management Review 2014-01-01

A growing body of research has extended the analysis materiality ESG criteria from perspective equity investors to creditors. Past and have demonstrated link between better management risk overall. Despite this consensus consistent evidence that performance is correlated with credit risk, no empirical yet linked cost or expense variances revenue shortfalls could explain these correlations. The authors attempt address lack mechanism‐based by citing then building on a number well‐publicized...

10.1111/jacf.12352 article EN Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 2019-06-01

This paper demonstrates that a structurally derived, internationally comparable index of checks and balances on executive discretion created by variation in political structures party systems affects relative rates basic telecommunications infrastructure deployment 147 countries during the period 1960 - 1994. Models omit characteristics prospective host country for investment confound whose economic demographic point to rapid demand growth services with those create potential trap investors...

10.1162/105864001300122575 article EN Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 2001-03-01

The likelihood that a government will meet its promises varies with the structure of nation9s political institutions. Where multiple independent actors wield veto power over potential policy changes, macroeconomic, tax, and regulatory stability be enhanced—thus reducing variance on an investment project9s expected return. This relationship is shown to hold for industry extremely high sunk costs politicization, namely, electric utilities. Managers considering in infrastructure projects should...

10.2307/41165931 article EN California Management Review 1998-01-01

This paper examines the joint impact of firm- and country-level factors on international plant location decisions semiconductor firms from 1994–2002. We find that these interact to influence investing abroad in a given host country. Firms with more advanced technological capabilities are likely make investments countries greater sophistication but not politically hazardous where they face expropriation hazards. less-advanced technology willing accept trade-off between political hazards...

10.1287/orsc.1040.0091 article EN Organization Science 2004-09-23

We examine the extent to which two sources of uncertainty over future policy environment - political hazards and regime change influence foreign-owned subsidiary exit rates. find that prior exits by peer firms enhance rates, particularly when are high. also a multinational firm’s own experience under current has moderating on rates in presence hazards, but it enhances after regime. These findings support argument contrast informational benefit conferred firms’ exits, firm proxies for actual...

10.1177/1476127004047619 article EN Strategic Organization 2004-10-19
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