Geoffrey A. Manne

ORCID: 0000-0003-4677-1938
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About
Contact & Profiles
Research Areas
  • Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Digital Platforms and Economics
  • ICT Impact and Policies
  • Legal and Constitutional Studies
  • Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
  • Intellectual Property Law
  • World Trade Organization Law
  • Intellectual Property and Patents
  • Legal Systems and Judicial Processes
  • EU Law and Policy Analysis
  • Copyright and Intellectual Property
  • Diverse Legal and Medical Studies
  • Global trade and economics
  • European and International Contract Law
  • Law, Rights, and Freedoms
  • Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
  • Intellectual Property Rights and Media
  • Taxation and Legal Issues
  • Economic Theory and Institutions
  • Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
  • Business Strategy and Innovation
  • Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
  • American Constitutional Law and Politics
  • Legal Cases and Commentary
  • Legal case studies and regulations

Center for International Environmental Law
2015-2024

Northwestern University
2021

Portland State University
2020

Bipartisan Policy Center
2020

Frank Easterbrook's seminal analysis of error-cost minimization in The Limits Antitrust has special relevance to antitrust intervention markets where innovation is a critical dimension competition. Both product and business innovations involve novel practices. Historically, the economics profession tended initially rely upon monopoly explanations for such Courts have reacted with similar hostility. But almost always there followed more nuanced economic understanding practice that recognized...

10.1093/joclec/nhp032 article EN Journal of Competition Law & Economics 2010-03-01

The antitrust landscape has changed dramatically in the last decade. Within two years alone, United States Department of Justice held hearings on appropriate scope Section 2, issued a comprehensive Report, and then repudiated it; European Commission risen as an aggressive leader single firm conduct enforcement by bringing abuse dominance actions assessing heavy fines against firms including Qualcomm, Intel, Microsoft. In States, most significant characteristics "new" approach have been more...

10.2139/ssrn.1577556 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2010-01-01

In recent months a veritable legal and policy frenzy has erupted around Google generally, more specifically concerning how its search activities should be regulated by government authorities the world in name of ensuring “search neutrality.” Concerns with engine bias have led to menu proposed regulatory reactions. Although debate focused upon possible remedies “problem” presented range Google’s business decisions, it largely missed predicate question whether is product market failure or...

10.2139/ssrn.1807951 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2011-01-01

The Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation capped debit card interchange fees for banks with assets of $10 billion. Credit and prepaid were not regulated. cap, which took effect on October 11, 2011, cut average fee covered from $0.50 $0.24 per transaction.The cap reduced annual revenues by between $6 billion $8 Covered have recouped these losses in indirect ways. In particular, they have:- Reduced availability fee-free current accounts. total number offering free...

10.2139/ssrn.2446080 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2014-01-01

While several scholars and policymakers have proposed that threats to privacy competition from concentration of data be incorporated into antitrust analysis, no one has yet articulated a coherent theory as how degrading or aggregating can anticompetitive — nor even what, precisely, harms are in this context. In paper, we survey evaluate the various attempts incorporate concerns antitrust’s domain. We find those more skeptical law’s ability deal with better argument.

10.2139/ssrn.2418779 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2014-01-01

In our submission, we argue that competition policy in the digital economy should be based on sound, theoretical underpinnings and rigorous, evidence-based analysis, best encapsulated “law economics” approach. Despite many expressed fears to contrary, markets are not inherently prone anti-competitive behavior, weight of economic theory evidence offer little support for asserted risk harm. We thus intervention take into account uncertainty harm, presence countervailing benefits problems...

10.2139/ssrn.3384405 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2018-01-01

This issue's Contemporary Critique, discusses the US Supreme Court decision in Ohio v.American Express (Amex).The ruling has sparked much interest (and controversy) as to its treatment of digital markets and platform economy.In his commentary, Geoffrey A. Manne supports Court's decision, offers insightful analysis why, mind, properly identifies competitive process platforms.Tim Wu's critique, on other hand, raises concerns evidence theory this case legacy ruling, which may undermine efficacy...

10.1093/jaenfo/jnz003 article EN Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 2019-03-01

Legal decision-making and enforcement under uncertainty are always difficult potentially costly. The risk of error is present given the limits knowledge, but it magnified by precedential nature judicial decisions: an erroneous outcome affects not only parties to a particular case, also all subsequent economic actors operating in “the shadow law.” inherent further exacerbated antitrust context where liability turns on difficult-to-discern effects challenged conduct. And this difficulty still...

10.2139/ssrn.3733662 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2020-01-01

Rate regulation can take many forms. Rates may be regulated through overt price controls, such as ceilings or floors; less-overt rules governing the pace of changes; quality mandates restrictions. Some rate regulations provide short-run benefits to certain groups consumers producers, but often result in shortages surpluses that diminish overall welfare. In long run, distorts investment incentives, leading a misallocation (e.g., under- over-investment).Because costs are so well-known,...

10.2139/ssrn.4412076 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2023-01-01

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10.2139/ssrn.4656027 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2024-01-01

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10.2139/ssrn.4721112 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2024-01-01
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