The Anh Han

ORCID: 0000-0002-3095-7714
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About
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Research Areas
  • Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Game Theory and Applications
  • Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research
  • Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
  • Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
  • Reinforcement Learning in Robotics
  • Auction Theory and Applications
  • Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
  • Machine Learning and Algorithms
  • Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Optimization and Search Problems
  • Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
  • Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing
  • AI-based Problem Solving and Planning
  • Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Semantic Web and Ontologies
  • Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
  • Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization
  • Data Stream Mining Techniques
  • Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
  • Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis
  • Game Theory and Voting Systems

Teesside University
2016-2025

University of Warwick
2020-2024

Digital Science (United Kingdom)
2024

University of Birmingham
2022

Universitat Ramon Llull
2022

University of Southampton
2012-2021

Universidade Nova de Lisboa
2008-2020

Instituto de Engenharia de Sistemas e Computadores Investigação e Desenvolvimento
2020

University of Lisbon
2012-2020

Université Libre de Bruxelles
2013-2020

Intelligent machines have reached capabilities that go beyond a level human being can fully comprehend without sufficiently detailed understanding of the underlying mechanisms. The choice moves in game Go (generated by Deep Mind?s Alpha Zero [1]) are an impressive example artificial intelligence system calculating results even expert for hardly retrace [2]. But this is, quite literally, toy example. In reality, intelligent algorithms encroaching more and into our everyday lives, be it...

10.1109/mts.2018.2876107 article EN IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 2018-12-01

In budget–limited multi–armed bandit (MAB) problems, thelearner’s actions are costly and constrained by a fixed budget.Consequently, an optimal exploitation policy may not be topull the arm repeatedly, as is case in other variantsof MAB, but rather to pull sequence of different arms thatmaximises agent’s total reward within budget. Thisdifference from existing MABs means that new approachesto maximising required. Given this, wedevelop two pulling policies, namely: (i) KUBE; (ii)fractional...

10.1609/aaai.v26i1.8279 article EN Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2021-09-20

Both conventional wisdom and empirical evidence suggest that arranging

10.1098/rsif.2022.0036 article EN other-oa Journal of The Royal Society Interface 2022-03-01

We introduce the budget–limited multi–armed bandit (MAB), which captures situations where a learner’s actions are costly and constrained by fixed budget that is incommensurable with rewards earned from machine, then describe first algorithm for solving it. Since learner has budget, problem’s duration finite. Consequently an optimal exploitation policy not to pull arm repeatedly, but combination of arms maximises agent’s total reward within budget. As such, all must be estimated, because any...

10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7758 article EN Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 2010-07-04

In budget-limited multi-armed bandit (MAB) problems, the learner's actions are costly and constrained by a fixed budget. Consequently, an optimal exploitation policy may not be to pull arm repeatedly, as is case in other variants of MAB, but rather sequence different arms that maximises agent's total reward within This difference from existing MABs means new approaches maximising required. Given this, we develop two pulling policies, namely: (i) KUBE; (ii) fractional KUBE. Whereas former...

10.48550/arxiv.1204.1909 preprint EN other-oa arXiv (Cornell University) 2012-01-01

In this paper we address the problem of budget allocation for redundantly crowdsourcing a set classification tasks where key challenge is to find trade-off between total cost and accuracy estimation. We propose CrowdBudget, an agent-based algorithm, that efficiently divides given among different in order achieve low estimation error. particular, prove CrowdBudget can at most max{0, K/2- O,(√B)} error with high probability, K number B size. This result significantly outperforms current best...

10.5555/2484920.2485063 article EN Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agents Systems 2013-05-06

Abstract When starting a new collaborative endeavor, it pays to establish upfront how strongly your partner commits the common goal and what compensation can be expected in case collaboration is violated. Diverse examples biological social contexts have demonstrated pervasiveness of making prior agreements on posterior compensations, suggesting that this behavior could been shaped by natural selection. Here, we analyze evolutionary relevance such commitment strategy relate costly punishment...

10.1038/srep02695 article EN cc-by Scientific Reports 2013-09-18

When creating a public good, strategies or mechanisms are required to handle defectors. We first show mathematically and numerically that prior agreements with posterior compensations provide strategic solution leads substantial levels of cooperation in the context goods games, results corroborated by available experimental data. Notwithstanding this success, one cannot, as other approaches, fully exclude presence defectors, raising question how they can be dealt avoid demise common good....

10.1098/rsif.2014.1203 article EN Journal of The Royal Society Interface 2014-12-24

Abstract Making agreements on how to behave has been shown be an evolutionarily viable strategy in one-shot social dilemmas. However, many situations aim establish long-term mutually beneficial interactions. Our analytical and numerical results reveal for the first time under which conditions revenge, apology forgiveness can evolve deal with mistakes within ongoing context of Iterated Prisoners Dilemma. We show that, when agreement fails, participants prefer take revenge by defecting...

10.1038/srep10639 article EN cc-by Scientific Reports 2015-06-09

The field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is going through a period great expectations, introducing certain level anxiety in research, business and also policy. This further energised by an AI race narrative that makes people believe they might be missing out. Whether real or not, belief this may detrimental as some stake-holders will feel obliged to cut corners on safety precautions, ignore societal consequences just "win". Starting from baseline model describes broad class technology races...

10.1371/journal.pone.0244592 article EN cc-by PLoS ONE 2021-01-26

Institutions can provide incentives to enhance cooperation in a population where this behaviour is infrequent. This process costly, and it thus important optimize the overall spending. problem be mathematically formulated as multi-objective optimization one wishes minimize cost of providing while ensuring minimum level cooperation, sustained over time. Prior works that consider question usually omit stochastic effects drive dynamics. In paper, we rigorous analysis problem, finite setting,...

10.1098/rspa.2021.0568 article EN cc-by Proceedings of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences 2021-10-01

Abstract Auditors can play a vital role in ensuring that tech companies develop and deploy AI systems safely, taking into account not just immediate, but also systemic harms may arise from the use of future capabilities. However, to support auditors evaluating capabilities consequences cutting-edge systems, governments need encourage range potential invest new auditing tools approaches. We evolutionary game theory model scenarios where government wishes incentivise cannot discriminate...

10.1088/2632-072x/ad424c article EN cc-by Journal of Physics Complexity 2024-04-23

Understanding the emergence of prosocial behaviours among self-interested individuals is an important problem in many scientific disciplines. Various mechanisms have been proposed to explain evolution such behaviours, primarily seeking conditions under which a given mechanism can induce highest levels cooperation. As these usually involve costs that alter individual pay-offs, it is, however, possible aiming for cooperation might be detrimental social welfare—the latter broadly defined as...

10.1098/rsif.2024.0547 article EN Journal of The Royal Society Interface 2024-11-01

Few problems have created the combined interest of so many unrelated areas as evolution cooperation. As a result, several mechanisms been identified to work catalyzers cooperative behavior. Yet, these studies, mostly grounded on evolutionary dynamics and game theory, neglected important role played by intention recognition in behavioral evolution. Here we address explicitly this issue, characterizing emerging from population recognizers. We derive Bayesian network model for context repeated...

10.1177/1059712311410896 article EN Adaptive Behavior 2011-07-26

The Shapley value is arguably the most central normative solution concept in cooperative game theory. It specifies a unique way which reward from cooperation can be "fairly" divided among players. While it has wide range of real world applications, its use many cases hampered by hardness computation. A number researchers have tackled this problem (i) focusing on classes games where computed efficiently, or (ii) proposing representation formalisms that facilitate such efficient computation,...

10.48550/arxiv.1306.4265 preprint EN other-oa arXiv (Cornell University) 2013-01-01

Intention recognition is the process of becoming aware intentions other agents, inferring them through observed actions or effects on environment. enables pro-activeness, in cooperating promoting cooperation, an

10.3233/aic-130559 article EN AI Communications 2013-01-01

Abstract Commitments have been shown to promote cooperation if, on the one hand, they can be sufficiently enforced and other cost of arranging them is justified with respect benefits cooperation. When either these constraints not met it leads prevalence commitment free-riders, such as those who commit only when someone else pays arrange commitments. Here, we show how intention recognition may circumvent weakness costly We describe an evolutionary model, in context one-shot Prisoner's...

10.1038/srep09312 article EN cc-by Scientific Reports 2015-03-20

The problem of promoting the evolution cooperative behaviour within populations self-regarding individuals has been intensively investigated across diverse fields behavioural, social and computational sciences. In most studies, cooperation is assumed to emerge from combined actions participating populations, without taking into account possibility external interference how it can be performed in a cost-efficient way. Here, we bridge this gap by studying model based on evolutionary game...

10.1038/s41598-018-34435-2 article EN cc-by Scientific Reports 2018-10-24
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