A5054420804- Auction Theory and Applications
- Game Theory and Applications
- Optimization and Search Problems
- Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs
- Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
- Computational Geometry and Mesh Generation
- Scheduling and Optimization Algorithms
- Algorithms and Data Compression
- Distributed systems and fault tolerance
- Cooperative Communication and Network Coding
- Complex Network Analysis Techniques
- Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
- Economic theories and models
- Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Machine Learning and Algorithms
- Markov Chains and Monte Carlo Methods
- Transportation and Mobility Innovations
- Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research
- Cryptography and Data Security
- Advanced Graph Theory Research
- Data Management and Algorithms
- Vehicle Routing Optimization Methods
- Peer-to-Peer Network Technologies
ETH Zurich
2013-2022
Université Paris Cité
2012-2018
Institut de Recherche en Informatique Fondamentale
2018
University of Salerno
2004-2015
Laboratoire d'Informatique Algorithmique: Fondements et Applications
2012-2015
Délégation Paris 7
2012-2015
University of Rome Tor Vergata
1999-2004
Institut national de recherche en informatique et en automatique
2002
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
2002
Sapienza University of Rome
1998
We present the first general bounds on mixing time of logit dynamics for wide classes strategic games. The describes behaviour a complex system whose individual components act "selfishly" and keep responding according to some partial ("noisy") knowledge system. In particular, we prove nearly tight potential games with dominant strategies. Our results show that, games, is upper lower bounded by an "exponential" in inverse noise maximum difference. Instead, strategies, cannot grow arbitrarily...
We present a technique to evaluate the approximation ratio on random instances of minimum energy broadcast problem in ad-hoc radio networks which is known be NP-hard and approximable within 12. Our relies polynomial-time computable lower bound optimal cost any instance. The main result this paper that has never achieved value greater than 6.4. Furthermore, worst values are for small network sizes. also provide clear geometrical motivation such good results.
We consider the problem of delivering $m$ messages between specified source-target pairs in a weighted undirected graph, by $k$ mobile agents initially located at distinct nodes graph. Each agent consumes energy proportional to distance it travels graph and we are interested optimizing total consumption for team agents. Unlike previous related work, heterogeneous with different rates (weights~$w_i$). To solve delivery problem, face three major challenges: \emph{Collaboration} (how work...
We present the first general positive result on construction of collusion-resistant mechanisms, that is, mechanisms guarantee dominant strategies even when agents can form arbitrary coalitions and exchange compensations (sometimes referred to as transferable utilities or side payments). This is a much stronger solution concept compared truthful group-strategyproof only impossibility results were known for this type in "classical" model.