Abstract In recent years, the tendency of number financial institutions to include cryptocurrencies in their portfolios has accelerated. Cryptocurrencies are first pure digital assets be included by asset managers. Although they have some commonalities with more traditional assets, own separate nature and behaviour as an is still process being understood. It therefore important summarise existing research papers results on cryptocurrency trading, including available trading platforms,...

The cryptocurrency market is amongst the fastest-growing of all financial markets in world. Unlike traditional markets, such as equities, foreign exchange and commodities, considered to have larger volatility illiquidity. This paper inspired by recent success using machine learning for stock prediction. In this work, we analyze present characteristics a high-frequency setting. particular, applied approach predict direction mid-price changes on upcoming tick. We show that there are universal...

In this paper, we consider the facility location problem un- der a novel model recently proposed in literature, which combines no-money constraint (i.e. impossibility to employ monetary transfers between mechanism and agents) with presence of heterogeneous facilities, i.e. facilities serving different purposes. Agents thus have significantly cost w.r.t. classical homogeneous studied literature. We initiate study non-utilitarian optimization functions under model. particular, case where goal...

One of the main challenges in mechanism design is to carefully engineer incentives ensuring truthfulness while maintaining strong social welfare approximation guarantees. But these objectives are often conflict, making it impossible effective mechanisms. An important class problems that belong this category budget-feasible Here, designer needs procure services maximum value from a set agents being on budget, i.e., having limited budget enforce truthfulness. However, as empirical studies...

We study the exploration-exploitation trade-off for large multiplayer coordination games where players strategise via Q-Learning, a common learning framework in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Q-Learning is known to have two shortcomings, namely non-convergence and potential equilibrium selection problems, when there are multiple fixed points, called Quantal Response Equilibria (QRE). Furthermore, whilst QRE full support finite games, it not clear how behaves as game becomes large. In...

In recent years, the tendency of number financial institutions including cryptocurrencies in their portfolios has accelerated. Cryptocurrencies are first pure digital assets to be included by asset managers. Although they have some commonalities with more traditional assets, own separate nature and behaviour as an is still process being understood. It therefore important summarise existing research papers results on cryptocurrency trading, available trading platforms, signals, strategy risk...

We design and analyze deterministic truthful approximation mechanisms for multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with only a constant number of distinct goods, each in arbitrary limited supply. Prospective buyers (bidders) have preferences over multisets items, i.e. more than one unit per good. Our objective is to determine allocations that maximize the Social Welfare. Despite recent theoretical advances on (for several goods) auctions single good), results combined setting are much scarser. main...

Motivated by privacy and security concerns in online social networks, we study the role of pressure opinion games. These are games, important economics sociology, that model formation opinions a network. We enrich definition (noisy) best-response dynamics for games introducing pressure, increasing with time, to reach an agreement.We prove clique always converges consensus (no matter level noise) if is high enough. Moreover, provide (tight) bounds on speed convergence; these polynomial number...

Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence of money, very little can be done enforce truthfulness. However, certain applications, money unavailable, morally unacceptable or might simply at odds with the objective mechanism. For example, Combinatorial Auctions (CAs), paradigmatic problem area, we aim solutions maximum social welfare, but...

We aim at identifying a minimal set of conditions under which algorithms with good approximation guarantees are truthful without money. In line recent literature, we wish to express such via verification assumptions, i.e., kind agents' misbehavior that can be made impossible by the designer.We initiate this research endeavour for paradigmatic problem in approximate mechanism design money, facility location. It is known how truthfulness imposes (even severe) losses and certain notions...

We present the first general positive result on construction of collusion-resistant mechanisms, that is, mechanisms guarantee dominant strategies even when agents can form arbitrary coalitions and exchange compensations (sometimes referred to as transferable utilities or side payments). This is a much stronger solution concept compared truthful group-strategyproof only impossibility results were known for this type in "classical" model.

Abstract In Stackelberg pricing a leader sets prices for items to maximize revenue from follower purchasing feasible subset of items. We consider computationally bounded followers who cannot optimize exactly over the range all subsets, but apply publicly known algorithms determine purchase. This corresponds general multidimensional when customers their valuation functions efficiently still aim act rationally best ability. two versions this novel type problem. MIn‐KNAPSACK variant are...

We design and analyze deterministic truthful approximation mechanisms for multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions involving only a constant number of distinct goods, each in arbitrary limited supply. Prospective buyers (bidders) have preferences over multisets items, i.e., more than one unit per good. Our objective is to determine allocations that maximize the Social Welfare. main results are multi-minded submodular bidders. In first setting bidder has positive value being allocated multiset from...