We study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish pull different directions degrees. When consults only single expert, expert withholds substantial information from maker. ask whether this situation is improved by having sequentially consult two experts. first show that there no perfect Bayesian equilibrium full revelation occurs. both same direction, it never beneficial both. In...

The problem and the solution. work motivation literature suggests existence of a level that goes beyond commonly known typologies intrinsic extrinsic motivation. purpose this article is to explore deeper motivation, meaningfulness, discuss connections between meaning at work, represented by concepts employee commitment engagement. This multidimensional approach combines individual psychological aspects with contextual cultural factors influence

We reexamine the major tenets of informational theory legislative rules, focusing on efficiency rules with varying degrees restrictiveness. When committees are heterogeneous, full is attainable under unrestrictive open rule as well somewhat restrictive modified rule. In contrast, closed always leads to inefficiencies. homogeneous, situation different. All equilibria inefficient regardless but greater than does Furthermore, gains more offset distributional losses degree preference divergence....

Journal Article Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders Get access Jean-Pierre Benoît, Benoît New York University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Vijay Krishna Perm State The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 68, Issue 1, January 2001, Pages 155–179, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00164 Published: 01 2001 history Received: November 1998 Accepted: February 2000

We study a multilateral bargaining procedure that extends Rubinstein's alternating offer game to the case of n players. The captures notion consistency in sense familiar cooperative theory and we use it establish links axiomatic bargaining.

We study a dynamic model of duopoly in which firms choose both prices and quantities. If quantity (capacity) choices are relatively inflexible, generally carry excess (idle) capacity equilibrium. Because this enforcement cost, unable to achieve monopoly levels. This contrasts with models compete either or quantities alone. On the other hand, if capacities flexible may be able sustain behaviour.

We study first- and second-price auctions with resale in a model independent private values. With asymmetric bidders, the resulting inefficiencies create motive for post-auction trade which, our model, takes place via monopoly pricing—the winner makes take-it-or-leave-it offer to loser. show (a) first-price auction has unique monotonic equilibrium; (b) resale, expected revenue from exceeds that auction. The inclusion of possibilities thus permits general ranking two is not available when...

We study optimal contracting under imperfect commitment in a model with an uninformed principal and informed agent. The can commit to pay the agent for his advice but retains decision‐making authority. Under contract, should (i) never induce fully reveal what he knows—even though this is feasible—and (ii) imprecise information. compare contracts those full as well delegation schemes. find that gains from are greatest when divergence preferences of moderate.

We study a model in which voters choose between two candidates on the basis of both ideology and competence. While is commonly known, are imperfectly informed about Voter preferences, however, such that alone determines voting. When voting compulsory, candidate majority prevails, this may not be optimal from social perspective. However, when voluntary costly, we show turnout adjusts endogenously so outcome large election always first-best.

We study the role of communication within a cartel. Our analysis is carried out in Stigler’s (1964) model repeated oligopoly with secret price cuts. Firms observe neither prices nor sales their rivals. For fixed discount factor, we identify conditions under which there are equilibria “cheap talk” that result near-perfect collusion, whereas all without such bounded away from this outcome. In our model, improves monitoring and leads to higher profits. (JEL C73, D43, D83, L12, L13, L25)

Perfect equilibria of finitely repeated games may be vulnerable to the possibility renegotiation among players. The authors study limiting properties set payoffs from that are immune renegotiation. Their main result is th at limit renegotiation-proof either a singleton or connected subset Pareto efficient frontier. A simple sufficient condition for latter occur lso provided. Copyright 1993 by Econometric Society.

We study the welfare properties of majority and supermajority rules when voting is costly values, costs, electorate sizes are all random. Unlike previous work, where size was either fixed or Poisson distributed, exhibited no limiting dispersion, we allow for general distributions that permit substantial dispersion. identify conditions on these guaranteeing a large election under rule produces utilitarian choice with probability one. Absent conditions, nonutilitarian outcomes possible, as...

Abstract Antitrust authorities view the exchange of information among firms regarding costs, prices, or sales as anticompetitive. Such exchanges allow competitors to closely monitor each other, thereby facilitating collusion. But aggregate information, perhaps via a third party, is legal. The logic that collusion difficult if identity price‐cutting firm cannot be ascertained. Here, we examine this using Stigler's model secret price cuts. We first identify circumstances such when no possible,...

We study a model in which two perfectly informed experts offer advice to decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish pull different directions degrees. When consults only single expert, expert withholds substantial information from maker. ask whether this situation is improved by having consult cabinet (two) experts. first show that there no perfect Bayesian equilibrium full revelation occurs. both same direction, it never beneficial both. In...

We study an R&D race between established firm and a startup under asymmetric information. investment brings success stochastically, but only if the innovation is feasible. The asymmetry that has better information about feasibility of innovation. show there equilibrium in which poorly informed wins more often, higher expected profits, than better-informed incumbent. When informational large, this unique outcome. channel by becomes competitive disadvantage appears to be new stems from fact...

Organizational theory suggests that authority should lie in the hands of those with information, yet power to transfer is rarely absolute practice. We investigate validity and application this advice a model optimal contracting between an uninformed principal informed agent where principal's commitment imperfect. show while full alignment interests combined delegation feasible, it never optimal. The contract "bang-bang" - one region state space, takes place, other, no place. then compare...