Abstract Residential segregation is a wide-spread phenomenon that can be observed in almost every major city. In these urban areas residents with different racial or socioeconomic background tend to form homogeneous clusters. Schelling’s famous agent-based model for residential explains how such clusters even if all agents are tolerant, i.e., they agree live mixed neighborhoods. For occur, it needs slight bias towards preferring similar neighbors. Very recently, has been investigated from...

Residential segregation in metropolitan areas is a phenomenon that can be observed all over the world. Recently, this was investigated via game-theoretic models. There, selfish agents of two types are equipped with monotone utility function ensures higher if an agent has more same-type neighbors. The strategically choose their location on given graph serves as residential area to maximize utility. However, sociological polls suggest real-world actually favoring mixed-type neighborhoods, and...

In most major cities and urban areas, residents form homogeneous neighborhoods along ethnic or socioeconomic lines. This phenomenon is widely known as residential segregation has been studied extensively. Fifty years ago, Schelling proposed a landmark model that explains in an elegant agent-based way. A recent stream of papers analyzed Schelling's using game-theoretic approaches. However, all these works considered models with given number discrete types modeling different groups. We focus...

Residential segregation is a wide-spread phenomenon that can be observed in almost every major city. In these urban areas residents with different racial or socioeconomic background tend to form homogeneous clusters. Schelling's famous agent-based model for residential explains how such clusters even if all agents are tolerant, i.e., they agree live mixed neighborhoods. For occur, it needs slight bias towards preferring similar neighbors. Very recently, has been investigated from...

Residential segregation is a wide-spread phenomenon that can be observed in almost every major city. In these urban areas residents with different racial or socioeconomic background tend to form homogeneous clusters. Schelling’s famous agent-based model for residential explains how such clusters even if all agents are tolerant, i.e., they agree live mixed neighborhoods. For occur, it needs slight bias towards preferring similar neighbors. Very recently, has been investigated from...

Human lives are increasingly influenced by algorithms, which therefore need to meet higher standards not only in accuracy but also with respect explainability. This is especially true for high-stakes areas such as real estate valuation. Unfortunately, the methods applied there often exhibit a trade-off between and

Traffic congestion is a major issue that can be solved by suggesting drivers alternative routes they are willing to take. This concept has been formalized as strategic routing problem in which single route suggested an existing one. We extend this formalization and introduce the Multiple-Routes problem, given start destination aims at finding up n different strategically disperse over, minimizing overall travel time of system.

We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic models with non-strategic that simply select the closest opened facility. In our model, every has a set of attracted client shopping locations weight corresponds to its spending capacity. Facility agents selfishly for opening their maximize total capacity, whereas decide how distribute capacity among in range. focus on...

We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic models with non-strategic that simply select the closest opened facility. In our model, every has a set of attracted client shopping locations weight corresponds to her spending capacity. Facility agents selfishly for opening their maximize total capacity, whereas decide how distribute capacity among in range. focus on...

Schelling games model the wide-spread phenomenon of residential segregation in metropolitan areas from a game-theoretic point view. In these agents different types each strategically select node on given graph that models area to maximize their individual utility. The latter solely depends neighboring nodes and it has been standard assumption consider utility functions are monotone number same-type neighbors. This simplifying recently challenged since sociological poll results suggest...

How do rational agents self-organize when trying to connect a common target? We study this question with simple tree formation game which is related the well-known fair single-source connection by Anshelevich et al. (FOCS'04) and selfish spanning games Gourves Monnot (WINE'08). In our correspond nodes in network that activate single outgoing edge target node (possibly via other nodes). Agents pay for their path target, costs are shared fairly among all using an edge. The main novelty of...

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In most major cities and urban areas, residents form homogeneous neighborhoods along ethnic or socioeconomic lines. This phenomenon is widely known as residential segregation has been studied extensively. Fifty years ago, Schelling proposed a landmark model that explains in an elegant agent-based way. A recent stream of papers analyzed Schelling's using game-theoretic approaches. However, all these works considered models with given number discrete types modeling different groups. We focus...

Network creation games investigate complex networks from a game-theoretic point of view. Based on the original model by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03] many variants have been introduced. However, almost all versions drawback that edges are treated uniformly, i.e. every edge has same cost and this common parameter heavily influences outcomes analysis these games. We propose analyze simple natural parameter-free network with non-uniform cost. Our models inspired social where forming link is...

Schelling's segregation model is a landmark in sociology. It shows the counter-intuitive phenomenon that residential between individuals of different groups can emerge even when all involved are tolerant. Although widely studied, no pure game-theoretic version where rational agents strategically choose their location exists. We close this gap by introducing and analyzing generalized models Schelling segregation, also have individual preferences. For our models, we investigate convergence...