David F. Larcker

ORCID: 0000-0002-9585-2227
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About
Contact & Profiles
Research Areas
  • Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
  • Financial Reporting and Valuation Research
  • Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
  • Accounting and Organizational Management
  • Private Equity and Venture Capital
  • Risk Management in Financial Firms
  • Securities Regulation and Market Practices
  • Corporate Taxation and Avoidance
  • Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
  • Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
  • Corporate Insolvency and Governance
  • Auction Theory and Applications
  • Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
  • Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Human Resource and Talent Management
  • Insurance and Financial Risk Management
  • Customer Service Quality and Loyalty
  • Personality Traits and Psychology
  • Gender Diversity and Inequality
  • State Capitalism and Financial Governance
  • Housing Market and Economics
  • Healthcare Policy and Management
  • Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Marine and Offshore Engineering Studies

Hoover Institution
2012-2024

Stanford University
2015-2024

European Corporate Governance Institute
2012-2024

California University of Pennsylvania
2002-2020

Universidad de Navarra
2020

University of Utah
2020

University of California, Davis
2020

University of Southern California
2020

Binghamton University
2020

University of Cambridge
2020

The statistical tests used in the analysis of structural equation models with unobservable variables and measurement error are examined. A drawback commonly applied chi square test, addition to known problems related sample size power, is that it may indicate an increasing correspondence between hypothesized model observed data as both properties relationship constructs decline. Further, contrary common assertion, risk making a Type II can be substantial even when large. Moreover, present...

10.1177/002224378101800104 article EN Journal of Marketing Research 1981-02-01

The statistical tests used in the analysis of structural equation models with unobservable variables and measurement error are examined. A drawback commonly applied chi square test, addit...

10.2307/3151312 article EN Journal of Marketing Research 1981-02-01

Several issues relating to goodness of fit in structural equations are examined. The convergence and differentiation criteria, as applied by Bagozzi, shown not stand up under mathematical or statistical analysis. authors argue that the choice interpretative statistic must be based on research objective. They demonstrate when this is done Fornell-Larcker testing system internally consistent it conforms rules correspondence for data abstract variables.

10.1177/002224378101800313 article EN Journal of Marketing Research 1981-08-01

Several issues relating to goodness of fit in structural equations are examined. The convergence and differentiation criteria, as applied by Bagozzi, shown not stand up under mathematical or...

10.2307/3150980 article EN Journal of Marketing Research 1981-08-01

Abstract We find that measures of board and ownership structure explain a significant amount cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, after controlling for standard economic determinants pay. Moreover, the signs coefficients on variables suggest CEOs earn greater compensation when governance structures are less effective. also predicted component arising from these characteristics has statistically negative relation with subsequent firm operating stock return performance. Overall, our...

10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 article EN cc-by-nc-nd Journal of Financial Economics 1999-03-01

10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.11.004 article EN Journal of Accounting and Economics 2009-11-28

We explain when and how staggered difference-in-differences regression estimators, commonly applied to assess the impact of policy changes, are biased. These biases likely be relevant for a large portion research settings in finance, accounting, law that rely on treatment timing, can result Type-I Type-II errors. summarize three alternative estimators developed econometrics literature addressing these biases, including their differences tradeoffs. apply re-examine prior published results...

10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.01.004 article EN cc-by Journal of Financial Economics 2022-02-22

This paper examines three questions on the value relevance of customer satisfaction measures: (1) Are measures leading indicators accounting performance? (2) Is economic (fully) reflected in contemporaneous book values? And (3) Does release provide new or incremental information to stock market? Many argue that improvements areas such as quality, employee satisfaction, and innovation represent investments firm-specific assets are not fully captured current measures. According these authors,...

10.2307/2491304 article EN Journal of Accounting Research 1998-01-01

The empirical research examining the association between typical measures of corporate governance and various accounting economic outcomes has not produced a consistent set results. We believe that these mixed results are partially attributable to difficulty in generating reliable valid for complex construct is termed “corporate governance.” Using sample 2,106 firms 39 structural (e.g., board characteristics, stock ownership, institutional activist existence debtholders, mix executive...

10.2308/accr.2007.82.4.963 article EN The Accounting Review 2007-07-01

Using confidential data of executive-specific short-term bonus plans, we investigate the extent to which executives manipulate earnings maximize present value plan payments. As such, this paper extends work Healy (1985). Like Healy, find evidence consistent with hypothesis that managers downwards when their bonuses are at maximum. Unlike no below minimum necessary receive any bonus. We demonstrate Healy's results lower bound likely be induced by his methodology.

10.1016/0165-4101(94)00376-g article EN cc-by-nc-nd Journal of Accounting and Economics 1995-02-01

Prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects.' However, one important limitation these studies is virtual absence any cross-sectional analyses attributes contracts.2 This related, in part, to problems associated with controlling for other factors that affect compensation. That is, contracts are

10.2307/2491081 article EN Journal of Accounting Research 1987-01-01

This paper analyzes the valuation of a compensation contract from manager's perspective. perspective is appropriate, for example, in research on incentive effects plan, because such are determined by how actions affect his compensation. In contrast, study cost-effectiveness shareholders' appropriate. Measuring value to manager difficult some diverse components packages (e.g., executive stock options and restricted stock) have payoffs that uncertain when granted. most empirical studies, each...

10.2307/2491032 article EN Journal of Accounting Research 1991-01-01

This study examines how different types of performance measures were weighted in a subjective balanced scorecard bonus plan adopted by major financial services firm. Drawing upon economic and psychological studies on evaluation compensation criteria, we develop hypotheses regarding the weights placed measures. We find that subjectivity allowed superiors to reduce “balance” awards placing most weight measures, incorporate factors other than evaluations, change criteria from quarter quarter,...

10.2308/accr.2003.78.3.725 article EN The Accounting Review 2003-07-01

We examine the relation between fees paid to auditors for audit and non‐audit services, choice of accrual measures a large sample firms. Using our pooled sample, we find that ratio total has positive with absolute value accruals similar Frankel, Johnson, Nelson [2002]. However, using latent class mixture models identify clusters firms homogenous regression structure reveals this association only occurs about 8.5% sample. In contrast fee results, consistent evidence negative level (both...

10.1111/j.1475-679x.2004.t01-1-00143.x article EN Journal of Accounting Research 2004-04-29

ABSTRACT This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity‐based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed existence of a link between CEO equity irregularities remains an open question. Because inferences from may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices, we use propensity‐score matching assess hidden (omitted...

10.1111/j.1475-679x.2009.00361.x article EN Journal of Accounting Research 2009-10-21

10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.04.001 article EN Journal of Accounting and Economics 2011-04-23

10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.05.001 article EN Journal of Financial Economics 2007-12-06

0 The financial support of Peat Marwick Main & Co., Ernst Young, David Hauck, and the Reginald H. Jones Center for Management Policy, Strategy, Organization is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank Sherwin Rosen, Stanley Baiman, Marshall Meyer, three anonymous reviewers, workshop participants at Wharton School, Harvard Business Washington University, Northwestern Odense Uppsala Shore Conference on Strategic Models their helpful comments. To improve understanding design...

10.2307/2393375 article EN Administrative Science Quarterly 1993-09-01
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