An online platform auctions an advertising slot. Several advertisers compete in the auction, and consumers differ their preferences. Prior to decides whether allow access information about (disclosure) or not (privacy). Disclosure improves match between but increases product prices, even without price‐discrimination. We provide conditions under which disclosure privacy is privately and/or socially optimal. When on downstream market, can lead increase a decrease prices depending nature of information.

We study the effects of integration between a search engine and publisher. In model in which (i) allocates users across publishers (ii) competes with to attract advertisers, we find that is biased against display many ads – even without integration. Integration can (but need not) lead own‐content bias. It also benefit consumers by reducing nuisance costs due excessive advertising. Advertisers are more likely suffer from than consumers. On net, welfare ambiguous.

Abstract We study situations in which consumers rely on a biased intermediary's advice when choosing among sellers. introduce the notion that sellers' and consumers' payoffs can be congruent or conflicting , show this has important implications for effects of bias. Under congruence, firm benefiting from bias an incentive to offer better deal than its rival better‐off under no conflict, favored offers lower utility, harms consumers. various policies dealing with their efficacy also depends...

The growing influence of internet platforms acting as content aggregators is one the most important challenges facing media industry. We develop a simple model to understand impact third-party bundling by social platform that has monopoly on showing user-generated consumers. In our model, consumers can access news either directly through newspaper’s website or indirectly platform, which also offers content. show bundling, when unilaterally implemented tends harm publishers and increase...

We study the profitability of bundling by an upstream firm that licenses technologies to downstream competitors and faces competition for one its technologies. In otherwise standard “ Chicago-style” model, existence can make inefficient profitable. Forcing firms use technology reassures each it will face weak competition. This allows extract more profit through monopolized technology. A similar logic profitable degrade interoperability with rival technologies, even without foreclosing...

We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogeneous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under discrimination, can condition its fee on sellers’ type. In model linear demand each side, we show (i) increases participation both sides, (ii) enhances total welfare, (iii) may result in strict Pareto improvement, seller types being better off than uniform...

Search engines enable advertisers to target consumers based on the query they have entered. In a framework in which search sequentially after having entered query, I show that such targeting reduces costs, improves matches and intensifies price competition. However, profit-maximizing monopolistic engine imposes distortion by charging too high an advertising fee, may negate benefits of targeting. The also has incentives provide suboptimal quality sponsored links. Competition among can...

We study platforms’ incentives to invest in cybersecurity under ad-funded and subscription-funded business models.

Abstract We present a novel rationale for bundling in vertical relations. In many markets, upstream firms compete to be the best downstream slots (e.g., shelf retail store or default application on platform). If multi-product firm faces competition subset of its products, we show that tying monopolised product with competitive ones can reduce rivals’ willingness offer slotting fees retailers. This strategy does not rely entry deterrence and achieved through contractual even virtual tying....

We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogenous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under discrimination, can condition its fee on sellers' type. In model linear demand each side, we show discrimination: (i) increases participation both sides; (ii) enhances total welfare; (iii) may result in strict Pareto improvement, seller types being better-off than...

We study mergers between firms operating in data-connected markets: the data generated as a byproduct of activity market A can be used by B. The effects such merger depend on whether trade among independent is possible and use benefits consumers or leads to more surplus extraction. When increases product B’s quality, both markets if cannot traded absent harms them otherwise. are extract consumer B, reduces it This paper was accepted Joshua Gans, business strategy. Funding: work supported...

An online platform auctions an advertising slot. Several advertisers compete in the auction, and consumers differ their preferences. Prior to decides whether allow access information about (disclosure) or not (privacy). Disclosure improves match between but increases product prices, even without price-discrimination. We provide conditions under which disclosure privacy is privately and/or socially optimal. When on downstream market, can lead increase a decrease prices depending nature of information.

Competition authorities all over the world worry that integration between search engines (mainly Google) and publishers could lead to abuses of dominant position. In particular, one concern is own-content bias, meaning Google would bias its rankings in favor it owns or has an interest in, detriment competitors users. order investigate this issue, we develop a theoretical framework which engine (i) allocates users across publishers, (ii) competes with attract advertisers. We show biased...

The growing influence of internet platforms acting as content aggregators is one the most important challenges facing media industry. We develop a parsimonious model to understand impact bundling by social platform. In our consumers can access news either directly through newspaper’s website, or indirectly platform, which also offers content. Even though platform shares revenues with newspapers whose it publishes, harms newspapers. Its effect on quality and consumption depends market...

In many industries, consumers rely on recommendations by an intermediary when choosing between competing products. this paper, we look at how the existence of contracts firms and intermediaries affects quality advice received consumers, firms' incentives to invest in improving their We consider a model with one two who decide much invest. Under variety contractual environments (vertical integration, ex post endorsement) show that, even though tends endorse best firm, endorsement distorts...

Abstract This paper studies how product customization and consumer privacy affect a monopolist’s incentives to engage in perfect price discrimination. We consider monopolist that faces an ex ante choice commit discrimination or uniform price. introduce simple model which can use analytics access data both price-discriminate offer customized products. In turn, consumers protect their avoid at cost. By committing not price-discriminate, the firm induces data, allows it customize product. It...

Search engines enable advertisers to target consumers based on the query they have entered. In a framework in which search sequentially after having entered query, I show that targeting reduces costs, improves matches and intensifies price competition. However, profit-maximizing engine imposes distortion by charging too high an advertising fee, may negate benefits of targeting. The also has incentives provide suboptimal quality sponsored links. Competition among can increase or decrease...

We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogenous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under discrimination, can condition its fee on sellers’ type. In model linear demand each side, we show discrimination: (i) increases participation both sides; (ii) enhances total welfare; (iii) may result in strict Pareto improvement, seller types being better-off than...