In most platform environments, the exclusive provision of premium content from leading creators (superstars) is used as a strategy to boost user participation and secure competitive edge vis-à-vis rivals. this article, we study impact superstar on competition complementors’ homing decisions. Two competing platforms facilitate interactions between consumers suppliers, which latter are identified by fringe complementors (e.g., independent developers, amateurs). When intense, more become...

We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogeneous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under discrimination, can condition its fee on sellers’ type. In model linear demand each side, we show (i) increases participation both sides, (ii) enhances total welfare, (iii) may result in strict Pareto improvement, seller types being better off than uniform...

Large, generalist, technology firms—so-called "big-tech" firms—powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a firm to be fiercely protective its data as way maintain market position the market. Counter this intuition, we demonstrate that willingly shares with an intruding tech generalist. We do so by developing model cross-market competition which collected via consumer usage each is factor product quality...

Abstract When knowledge sharing is non-contractible, we show that competing downstream firms may prefer to help improve an inefficient alternative supply source than the technology of efficient actual supplier—even if this costless. A firm can have incentives decrease efficiency supplier in order its outside options. Non-controlling partial backward ownership can—through participation firm(s) upstream profits—align and customers. This improves industry performance while simultaneously...

Abstract We analyze the ability of firms to sustain collusion in a setting which horizontally differentiated can price discriminate based on private information. Firms receive private, noisy signals regarding customers’ preferences. find that there is non‐monotonic relationship between signal quality and sustainability collusion. Starting from low level, an increase precision first facilitates There is, however, threshold beyond any further renders less sustainable. Our analysis provides...

We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogenous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under discrimination, can condition its fee on sellers' type. In model linear demand each side, we show discrimination: (i) increases participation both sides; (ii) enhances total welfare; (iii) may result in strict Pareto improvement, seller types being better-off than...

Abstract Supplier market power—such as the ability of branded goods suppliers to dictate terms retailers—is an important feature many markets. We show that supplier power can counteract effects downstream mergers on consumer prices where there are two-part contracts. This is because greater allows set contracts internalise partially impact merger prices. Post-merger, reduces per-unit price at which it supplies merged firms, with aim maintaining total industry profitability—and then recoups...

Digital platform ecosystems thrive on their ability to acquire and leverage user data across multiple data-driven services. This enables dominant platforms harness insights obtained from primary markets, where is collected, thus gaining a competitive advantage in secondary they exploit this data. While cross-use brings about efficiencies, policymakers worldwide express concerns the economic power potential distortion of competition innovation incentives associated with it. To address these...

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Algorithmic learning gives rise to a data-driven network effects, which allow dominant platform reinforce its market position. Data-driven effects can also spill over related markets and thereby leverage This has led policymakers propose data siloing mandated sharing remedies for platforms in order keep digital open contestable. While seeks prevent the spillover of generated by algorithmic other markets, share this externality with rival firms. Using game-theoretic model, we investigate...

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Abstract Platforms choose between offering exclusive deals or uniform prices to content providers in a setting where can multi-home single-home. We find that platforms offer for sufficiently large small values of standalone benefits. For benefits, there are relatively proportion multi-homers single-homers, allow extract more efficiently from the provider type is market. Hence, it becomes lucrative employ regardless pricing strategy chosen by rival platform. benefits being small, equilibrium...