Ethan Ligon

ORCID: 0000-0003-4928-0616
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About
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Research Areas
  • Agricultural risk and resilience
  • Income, Poverty, and Inequality
  • Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare
  • Economics of Agriculture and Food Markets
  • Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics
  • Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
  • Economic theories and models
  • Agricultural Economics and Policy
  • Microfinance and Financial Inclusion
  • Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
  • Cooperative Studies and Economics
  • Land Rights and Reforms
  • Economic Growth and Productivity
  • Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Economic Theory and Policy
  • Insurance and Financial Risk Management
  • Global trade, sustainability, and social impact
  • Agricultural Innovations and Practices
  • China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance
  • Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
  • Game Theory and Applications
  • Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
  • Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
  • Merger and Competition Analysis

University of California, Berkeley
2010-2024

World Bank
2020

A.P. Giannini Foundation
2001-2017

Anheuser-Busch InBev (United States)
2013

Economic Research Service
2007

University of California Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources
2007

Journal Article Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies Get access Ethan Ligon, Ligon University of California, Berkeley Giannini Foundation Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Jonathan P. Thomas, Thomas St. Andrews Tim Worrall Keele The Review Economic Studies, Volume 69, Issue 1, January 2002, Pages 209–244, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00204 Published: 01 2002 history Received: March 1999...

10.1111/1467-937x.00204 article EN The Review of Economic Studies 2002-01-01

Journal Article Measuring Vulnerability Get access Ethan Ligon, Ligon University of California, Berkeley Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Laura Schechter The Economic Journal, Volume 113, Issue 486, March 2003, Pages C95–C102, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00117 Published: 10 2003

10.1111/1468-0297.00117 article EN The Economic Journal 2003-03-01

Journal Article Risk Sharing and Information in Village Economies Get access Ethan Ligon University of California, Berkeley Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review Economic Studies, Volume 65, Issue 4, October 1998, Pages 847–864, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00071 Published: 01 1998 history Received: May 1997 Accepted: December

10.1111/1467-937x.00071 article EN The Review of Economic Studies 1998-10-01

10.1023/a:1015676113101 article EN Journal of Economic Growth 2002-01-01

The availability of digital payment technologies (such as internet banking, mobile money, and credit/debit cards) has rapidly increased in the developing world, is a cornerstone for financial inclusion initiatives countries. Despite significant efforts to promote payments, rates adoption remain modest some low-income In particular, rate India remains low despite adoption. this paper, we consider possible reasons among merchants Jaipur, with small fixed-location store enterprises. Using...

10.1371/journal.pone.0219450 article EN cc-by PLoS ONE 2019-07-31

Recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation is systematically related to income, thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk-pooling. We attempt explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained commitment, test using data from three Indian villages. find can fully response but it fails distribution across...

10.2139/ssrn.1776648 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2000-01-01

10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.12.002 article EN Journal of Development Economics 2011-12-13

Abstract This article examines the structure of contractual relations between growers and first handlers in California fruit vegetable markets. Evidence on existing structures is collected from on‐site interviews a small mail survey market intermediaries who contract with independent growers. Four generic instruments are identified—input control, field visits, quality measurement, residual price risk—which used to coordinate which help alleviate information asymmetries align incentives...

10.2307/1349886 article EN Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 1999-10-01

Over the last several decades, World Bank has accumulated a large number of datasets from countries which are based on household-level surveys, statistically representative populations those countries, and include data non-durable expenditures. These expenditures can be used to measure economic welfare - indeed, this kind measurement is chief reason d'etre collection survey data. Though micro-data these surveys not generally available, provides aggregate by decile for many countries....

10.2139/ssrn.1769944 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2007-01-01

Abstract Risk‐averse farmers in the produce industry grow a product whose market price is often quite unpredictable. Shippers or other intermediaries shield farmer from much of this risk; however, actual contracts between growers and shippers vary considerably across commodities residual risk face. We hypothesize that imperfect quality measurement results moral hazard problem, provides additional information regarding quality. As consequence, an efficient contract does not all idiosyncratic...

10.2307/1244011 article EN American Journal of Agricultural Economics 1999-08-01

Over the last several decades, World Bank has accumulated a large number of datasets from countries which are based on household-level surveys, statistically representative populations those countries, and include data non-durable expenditures. These expenditures can be used to measure economic welfare -- indeed, this kind measurement is chief raison d'etre collection survey data. Though micro-data these surveys not generally available, provides aggregate by decile for many countries....

10.22004/ag.econ.120420 article EN Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UCB 2007-04-10

Abstract In this paper we focus on mechanisms of coordination in agricultural contracts. Our approach is intended to advance understanding social relations production and distribution power agrofood systems. Through an analysis contracts between farmers intermediaries (e.g., processors, shippers, consignment agents) for California fruits vegetables, identify three functions contracts: they help coordinate production, provide incentives (and penalties) induce particular behaviors, allow share...

10.1111/j.1549-0831.2001.tb00072.x article EN Rural Sociology 2001-09-01

A number of researchers have recently proposed a variety different 'vulnerability' measures designed to capture the welfare consequences risk for poor households, and also approaches estimating these various household vulnerability. However, it's possible 'mix-and-match' estimators measures. Here we conduct Monte Carlo experiments explore performance with measures, under assumptions regarding underlying economic environment.

10.2139/ssrn.1776646 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2004-01-01

Traditional poverty measures neglect several important dimensions of household welfare. In this paper we construct a measure ‘vulnerability’ which allows us to quantify the welfare loss associated with as well any variety different sources uncertainty. Applying our panel dataset from Bulgaria in 1994, find that and risk play roughly equal roles reducing Aggregate shocks are more than idiosyncratic risk, but households headed by an employed, educated male less vulnerable aggregate other households.

10.2139/ssrn.1776647 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2003-01-01

What motivates people in rural villages to share? We first elicit a baseline level of sharing using standard, anonymous dictator game. Then variants the game that allow for either revealing dictator's identity or allowing choose recipient, we attribute variation three dierent motives. The these, directed altruism, is related preferences, while remaining two are incentive-related (sanctions and reciprocity). observe high average levels our treatment, across individuals depends importantly on...

10.2139/ssrn.1763920 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2011-01-01

Rates of long-run economic growth are not independent across countries. To account for this dependence we decompose the spatial covariance function rates into a each country's own observable characteristics, its unobservable and cross-country spillovers. We use original data on distance to structure observed variation in countries' long term rates. estimate magnitude interdependence among nations, give nonparametric characterization relationship between These spillovers turn out be quite...

10.2139/ssrn.1776750 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2001-01-01

Much recent empirical work on intra-household allocation uses the axiomatic Nash Bargaining model to make predictions about how distribution of consumption within household will respond individuals' income shocks. However, one basic axioms underlying this approach is that allocations be Pareto optimal, so forward-looking, risk adverse members ought expected smooth away any such response shocks-Pareto optimality seems too strong in a dynamic setting. In paper we use explicitly framework and...

10.2139/ssrn.1776810 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2011-01-01

Abstract Relative performance schemes such as tournaments are commonly used in markets for a variety of livestock and processing commodities, while explicit versions these rarely fresh fruits vegetables specialty grains. We show how contracts latter commodities do fact provide relative incentives, albeit indirectly, via payment mechanism that depends on market prices. In contracts, compensation is often an increasing function revenue; this implements scheme by making each grower's his own...

10.1111/0002-9092.00158 article EN American Journal of Agricultural Economics 2001-05-01

Using data on individual consumption expenditures from a sample of farm households in the Philippines, we construct direct test risk-sharing implications collective household model. We are able to contrast efficient outcomes predicted by model with might expect environments which food delivers not only utils, but also nutrients affect future productivity. Finally, each these two models third, involving hidden action problem within household; this case, provision incentives implies that...

10.22004/ag.econ.120421 article EN Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UCB 2011-02-01
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