Journal Article Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies Get access Ethan Ligon, Ligon University of California, Berkeley Giannini Foundation Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Jonathan P. Thomas, Thomas St. Andrews Tim Worrall Keele The Review Economic Studies, Volume 69, Issue 1, January 2002, Pages 209–244, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00204 Published: 01 2002 history Received: March 1999...

We revisit kinetic relaxation and soliton/boson star nucleation in fuzzy scalar dark matter featuring short-ranged self-interactions <a:math xmlns:a="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><a:mrow><a:msub><a:mrow><a:mi mathvariant="script">H</a:mi></a:mrow><a:mrow><a:mi>int</a:mi></a:mrow></a:msub><a:mo>=</a:mo><a:mo>−</a:mo><a:mi>λ</a:mi><a:mo stretchy="false">|</a:mo><a:mi>ψ</a:mi><a:msup><a:mrow><a:mo...

A theoretical model is developed in which both buybacks and the adoption of an IMF programme can be used as screening devices enable a creditor to discriminate between debtor countries are willing use debt relief order invest repay not. Asymmetric information assumed. This problem solved if country has sufficient resources engage buyback so gain relief. When credit constrained, alternative mechanism undertake return for reduction possibly loan.

Rigidity in real hiring wages plays a crucial role some recent macroeconomic models. But are really so noncyclical? We propose using employer/employee longitudinal data to track the cyclical variation paid workers newly hired into specific entry jobs. Illustrating methodology with 1982–2008 from Portuguese census of employers, we find were about 1.8 percent higher when unemployment rate was 1 percentage point lower. Like most evidence on other aspects wage cyclicality, our results suggest...

Using wave kinetics, we estimate the emergence timescale of gravitating Bose-Einstein condensates/Bose stars in kinetic regime for a general multicomponent Schr\"odinger-Poisson (SP) system. We identify some effects diffusion and friction pieces wave-kinetic Boltzmann equation (at leading order perturbation theory) provide estimates nucleation rate condensates. test our analysis using full ($3+1$)-dimensional simulations SP With an eye toward applications to dark matter, investigate two...

This paper considers a class of two-player dynamic games in which each player controls one-dimensional variable we interpret as level cooperation. In the base model, there is an irreversibility constraint stating that this can never be reduced, only increased. It otherwise satisfies usual discounted repeated game assumptions. Under certain restrictions on payoff function, make stage resemble continuous version Prisoners’ Dilemma, characterize efficient symmetric equilibria, and show...

This paper analyses a model in which firms cannot pay discriminate based on year of entry. It is assumed that workers can costlessly quit at any time, while are committed to contracts. We solve for the dynamics wages and unemployment, show real display degree downward rigidity do not necessarily clear labor market. Using sectoral productivity data from post-war US economy, we assess ability match actual unemployment series. also equal treatment follows assumption at-will employment...

The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payoffs. If informed player is arbitrarily patient, relative to uninformed player, then characterization for player's payoffs essentially same as that in undiscounted case. This implies even small amounts can lead a discontinuous change equilibrium payoff set. For case equal discount factors, however, under an assumption strictly individually rational exist,...

ABSTRACT We present an overview of models long‐term self‐enforcing labour contracts in which risk‐sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model developed that sufficiently general to encompass two‐agent problem central most literature, including variable hours. consider two‐sided limited commitment and look at its implications aggregate market variables. empirical testing available evidence. also one‐sided there exists a considerable amount support.

This paper considers reputation effects in a repeated game between two long-run players, one of whom is relatively patient and may be committed to fixed strategy which punishes the opponent for increasingly long periods whenever inappropriate actions are taken. By following this commitment strategy, more player can induce sufficiently experiment see whether also being followed off equilibrium path. guarantee (in any Nash equilibrium) payoff close highest feasible consistent with individual...

Abstract This paper analyzes a model of private unemployment insurance under limited commitment and public subject to moral hazard in an economy with continuum agents infinite time horizon. The dynamic steady‐state properties the optimum scheme are established. interaction between schemes is examined. Examples constructed show that for some parameter values increased can reduce welfare by crowding out more than one‐to‐one other mix both be maximizing.

Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the type of players. If a possibility that player an automaton committed to particular pure or mixed stage -game action, then this provides lower bound on Nash equilibrium payoffs normal player. The best available and robust existence other types. results extended case two-sided uncertainty. This work extends Schmidt (1993) who analysed restricted class conflicting interest games.

The fluctuations in incomes inherent rural communities can be attenuated by reciprocal assistance. A model of assistance based upon rational action and voluntary participation is presented. Individuals provide only if the costs so doing are outweighed benefits from expected future reciprocation. distinction made between general reciprocity, where counter obligation but not certain, balanced there a firm obligation. This reflected including loan or quasi-credit element any It shown how this...

We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong ‘perturbation implies efficiency’ results require that the perturbations must include strategies are ‘draconian’ sense they prepared to punish maximum extent possible. Moreover, there is a draconian strategy whose presence guarantees any equilibrium efficient. also argue of Anderlini and Sabourian (1995) using perturbation cooperative (and hence nondraconian) not due computability per se but further restrictions...