We experimentally study the impact of public opinion poll releases on voter turnout and welfare in a participation game. find higher overall rates when polls inform electorate about levels support for candidates than are prohibited. Distinguishing between allied floating voters, our data show that this increase is entirely due to voters. When indicate equal candidates, high low (compared situation without polls). In contrast, reveal more unequal support, lower with information, while effect...

We study the effect of social embeddedness on voter turnout by investigating role information about other voters' decisions. do so in a participation game, which we distinguish between early and late voters. Each is told one voter's decision. Cases are distinguished where voters allies (support same group) or adversaries (with opposing preferences) they uncertain each other's preferences. Our experimental results show that matters: this increases aggregate approximately 50%. The largest...

We study a citizen‐candidate‐entry model with private information about ideal points. fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of entry game and show that only relatively “extreme” citizen types enter electoral competition as candidates, whereas more “moderate” never enter. It generally leads to substantial political polarization, even when electorate is not polarized citizens understand they vote for extreme candidates. polarization increases in costs decreases benefits from...

We experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence. In game, one special interest (i.e., a corporate firm) has opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring two competing candidates. The success of investment depends on whether or not candidates are willing and able collude low‐tax do harm their relative chances elections. experiment, successful never materializes when firm interact just once. By contrast, it yields substantially...

We report the results of a laboratory experiment based on citizen–candidate model with private information about ideal points. Inefficient political polarization is observed in all treatments; that is, citizens extreme points enter as candidates more often than moderate citizens. Second, less entry occurs, even greater polarization, when voters have directional candidates’ points, using ideological party labels. Nonetheless, this welfare enhancing because inefficiency from outweighed by...

We study the interaction between competitive markets that produce large but unequally distributed welfare gains and elections through which poor majority can redistribute income away from rich minority. In our simple laboratory democracy, subjects first earn their by trading in a double auction market thereafter vote on redistributive policies two-candidate elections. addition, one of treatments attempt to influence candidates’ policy choices transferring money them. observe very high levels...

We study the interaction between competitive markets that produce unequally distributed welfare gains and elections through which poor majority can redistribute income away from rich minority. In our simple laboratory democracy, subjects first earn their by trading in a double auction market thereafter vote on redistributive policies two-candidate elections. addition, one of treatments have opportunity to influence transferring money candidates. observe very high levels redistribution - even...

We report the results of a laboratory experiment based on citizen‐candidate model with private information about ideal points. Inefficient political polarization is observed in all treatments; that is, citizens extreme points enter as candidates more often than moderate citizens. Second, less entry occurs, even greater polarization, when voters have directional candidates’ points, using ideological party labels. Nonetheless, this welfare enhancing because inefficiency from outweighed by...

This paper studies the effects of patents and subsidies on R&D investment decisions. The theoretical framework is a two-stage game consisting an market stage. In equilibrium, both induce same amount investment, which higher than without governmental incentives. first stage, firms can invest in stochastic project might lead to reduction marginal production costs second face price competition. Both stages are implemented laboratory experiment obtained results support predictions. Patents...

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We experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence. In game, one lobbyist has opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring two competing candidates. The success of lobbying investment depends on whether or not candidates are willing respond and able collude low‐tax do harm their relative chances elections. experiment, we find is never successful when interact just once. By contrast, it yields substantially lower redistribution...

We experimentally study compulsory majority voting over two alternatives in small committees. The committee members share a common interest, and each member decides on whether to buy private signal about which alternative better suits their interest. A is valuable but only imperfectly indicates the alternative. In experiment, both standing ad hoc committees perform average poorly, former do even worse have much higher performance variation than latter ones. attribute low efficiency limited...