The diversity in wealth and social status is present not only among humans, but throughout the animal world. We account for this observation by generating random variables that determine of players engaging prisoner's dilemma game. Here term used to address extrinsic factors mapping game payoffs individual fitness. These may increase or decrease fitness a player depending on its location spatial grid. consider different distributions players, find power-law distribution enables best...

The effects of payoffs and noise on the maintenance cooperative behavior are studied in an evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game with players located sites different two-dimensional lattices. This system exhibits a phase transition from mixed state cooperators defectors to homogeneous one where only remain alive. Using systematic Monte Carlo simulations levels generalized mean-field approximations we have determined boundaries (critical points) separating two phases plane temperature (noise)...

Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also between networks are outmost importance. We therefore study outcome public goods game on two interdependent that connected by means a utility function, which determines how payoffs both jointly influence success players in each individual network. show an unbiased coupling allows spontaneous emergence network reciprocity, is capable to maintain healthy levels cooperation even extremely adverse conditions. The mechanism, however,...

Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) distributed on a two-dimensional lattice. rate strategy adoption from randomly chosen neighbors is controlled by payoff difference and two-value pre-factor w characterizing whom learned from. reduced teaching activity concentrations ν at beginning fixed further on. Numerical analytical calculations...

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on different regular graphs as a function noise level underlying strategy adoptions. focus effects that are brought about by group sizes which individuals participate, revealing larger groups players may induce qualitatively behavior when approaching deterministic limit adoption. While pairwise interactions an intermediate uncertainty adoptions ensure optimal conditions for survival cooperators at specific graph topology, warrant...

The efficiency of institutionalized punishment is studied by evaluating the stationary states in spatial public goods game comprising unconditional defectors, cooperators, and cooperating pool punishers as three competing strategies. Fines costs are considered two main parameters determining distributions strategies on square lattice. Each player collects a payoff from five five-person games, evolution subsequently governed imitation based pairwise comparisons at low level noise. impact...

The promise of punishment and reward in promoting public cooperation is debatable. While traditionally considered more successful than reward, the fact that cost frequently fails to offset gains from enhanced has lead some reconsider as main catalyst behind collaborative efforts. Here we elaborate on "stick vs. carrot" dilemma by studying evolution spatial goods game, where besides traditional cooperators defectors, rewarding supplement array possible strategies. latter are willing...

Situations where individuals have to contribute joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure maximize individual success tends create a tragedy of commons (such as over-fishing destruction our environment). This contribution addresses number related puzzles human behavior with an game theoretical approach it has been successfully used explain other biological species many times, from bacteria vertebrates....

We have studied an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with players located on two types of random regular graphs a degree 4. The analysis is focused the effects payoffs and noise (temperature) maintenance cooperation. When varying level and/or highest payoff, system exhibits second-order phase transition from mixed state cooperators defectors to absorbing where only remain alive. For graph (and Bethe lattice) behavior similar those found previously square lattice nearest neighbor...

Abstract Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity out reach isolated networks, we here address question just how much there should be. Intuitively, one might assume more better. However, show in fact only an intermediate density sufficiently strong warrants optimal resolution...

We study the evolution of public cooperation on two interdependent networks that are connected by means a utility function, which determines to what extent payoffs in one network influence success players other network. find stronger bias higher level cooperation. Yet benefits enhanced just as biased functions themselves. While may thrive network, still be plagued defectors. Nevertheless, aggregate both is than attainable an isolated This positive effect due suppressed feedback individual...

We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides classical strategies (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify identify consequences two strategies. Since punishment costly, lose evolutionary competition case well-mixed interactions. When interactions are taken into account, however, outcome can be strikingly different,...

Inspired by the fact that people have diverse propensities to punish wrongdoers, we study a spatial public goods game with defectors and different types of punishing cooperators. During game, cooperators class-specific probabilities subsequently share associated costs sanctioning. We show in presence highest level cooperation is always attainable through selection mechanism. Interestingly, does not necessarily favor evolution punishers who would be able prevail on their own against...

Coevolution between strategy and network structure is established as a means to arrive at optimal conditions for resolving social dilemmas. Yet recent research highlights that the interdependence networks may be just important of an individual network. We therefore introduce coevolution study whether it can give rise elevated levels cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game. show self-organizes so yield evolution cooperation. Even under extremely adverse cooperators prevail where on isolated...

The effectiveness of punishment can be challenged by an unwillingness to shoulder the costs and noncooperators who punish cooperators. Simulations based on techniques from statistical physics show how these cancel one another in unlikely counterintuitive evolutionary outcome.

Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change in environmental states, but also react them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions risk of future losses are inextricably linked. These works, however, often use an idealistic assumption is constant affected by behaviors. Here, we develop coevolutionary game approach captures coupled dynamics...

While actors in a population can interact with anyone else freely, social relations significantly influence our inclination toward particular individuals. The consequence of such interactions, however, may also form the intensity established earlier. These dynamical processes are captured via coevolutionary model staged multiplex networks two distinct layers. In so-called relationship layer, weights edges among players change time as games played alternative interaction layer. As an...