Stefania Ottone

ORCID: 0000-0002-7569-5404
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About
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Research Areas
  • Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
  • Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
  • Economic Policies and Impacts
  • Economic Theory and Institutions
  • Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
  • Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics
  • Economic theories and models
  • Game Theory and Applications
  • Corporate Taxation and Avoidance
  • Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Behavioral Health and Interventions
  • Economic and Environmental Valuation
  • Management, Economics, and Public Policy
  • Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Political Philosophy and Ethics
  • Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Legal and Constitutional Studies
  • Consumer Attitudes and Food Labeling
  • Weber, Simmel, Sociological Theory

University of Milano-Bicocca
2009-2019

Center for Interdisciplinary Studies
2008-2018

European University Institute
2014

University of Calabria
2013

University of Rome Tor Vergata
2013

Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”
2004-2007

This study examines cultural differences in ordinary dishonesty between Italy and Sweden, two countries with different reputations for trustworthiness probity. Exploiting a set of cross-cultural tax compliance experiments, we find that the average level evasion (as measure dishonesty) does not differ significantly Swedes Italians. However, also uncover national "styles" dishonesty. Specifically, while are more likely to be either completely honest or dishonest their fiscal declarations,...

10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00472 article EN cc-by Frontiers in Psychology 2016-04-07

As shown by the recent crisis, tax evasion poses a significant problem for countries such as Greece, Spain and Italy. While these societies certainly possess weaker fiscal institutions compared to other EU members, might broader cultural differences between northern southern Europe also help explain citizens’ (un)willingness pay their taxes? To address this question, we conduct laboratory experiments in UK Italy, two which straddle North-South divide. Our design allows us examine willingness...

10.1371/journal.pone.0150277 article EN cc-by PLoS ONE 2016-02-26

Abstract The social contract approach to the study if institutions aims at providing a solution problem of compliance with rational agreements in situations characterized by conflict between individual rationality and optimality. After short discussion some attempts deal this from choice perspective, we focus on John Rawls's idea 'sense justice' its application explanation stability well-ordered society. We show how relevant features theory can be captured behavioral game model beliefs...

10.1515/auk-2011-0120 article EN Analyse & Kritik 2011-05-01

While second-party punishment is suitable in small groups, third-party much more common large societies, where it generally recognized as a social norm enforcement device that may guarantee stability. However, the presence of potential additional punisher who observes violation and decides to intervene becomes probable. The question arises whether would be robust with respect an enlargement pool altruistic punishers, namely introduction second punisher. relevance this evident because, should...

10.2202/1555-5879.1460 article EN Review of Law & Economics 2011-01-30

This article provides an experimental investigation of third parties' sanctioning behavior, in order to understand whether public officials (e.g., judges, politicians, or regulators), when deciding about top-down interventions aimed at punishing wrongdoers, are sensitive bottom-up pressure on the part ordinary citizens, who major victims wrongdoers' behavior. We set up a novel five-treatment design and compare situations where wrongdoer acts under: (1) no third-party punishment; (2)...

10.1093/jleo/ewu007 article EN The Journal of Law Economics and Organization 2014-05-07

Increasing population age and low fertility rates, which characterize most modern societies, compromise the balance between people who can participate in labor market need care. This is a demographic social issue that likely to grow importance for future generations. It therefore crucial understand what factors positively influence decisions. Policies related availability costs of different kinds childcare (e.g. formal care, grandparents, childminders) should be considered after an...

10.15185/izawol.382.v2 article EN IZA World of Labor 2024-01-01

Abstract This paper analyses, by means of an economic experiment, the impact a vertical review on third-party punishment. Whereas existing empirical literature has studied, under many different aspects, costly punishment as such, it not addressed second “instance” (competent to overrule decisions first punisher) incidence and amount such first-instance underlying unwanted behaviour (“stealing”). In this paper, we apply experimental methodology that allows us construct in lab counterfactual...

10.1515/rle-2015-0018 article EN Review of Law & Economics 2015-05-20

The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First all, it focuses on the decisional process that leads to creation a social norm. Secondly, analyses mechanisms through which subjects conform their behaviour In particular, our aim study role and nature Normative Empirical Expectations influence people's decisions. tool Exclusion Game, sort 'triple mini-dictator game'. It represents situation where 3 - players A have decide how allocate sum S among themselves fourth subject player B who...

10.2139/ssrn.1151245 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2008-01-01
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