A5081914209- Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Economic Policies and Impacts
- Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
- Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Economic theories and models
- Corporate Taxation and Avoidance
- Game Theory and Voting Systems
- Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics
- Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Local Government Finance and Decentralization
- Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Action Observation and Synchronization
- Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Politics, Economics, and Education Policy
- Merger and Competition Analysis
- Behavioral Health and Interventions
- Free Will and Agency
- Income, Poverty, and Inequality
- Psychology of Social Influence
- Social Policy and Reform Studies
- Judicial and Constitutional Studies
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro”
2008-2021
University of Milano-Bicocca
2010-2019
University of Turin
2012-2013
Piedmont University
2007
This study examines cultural differences in ordinary dishonesty between Italy and Sweden, two countries with different reputations for trustworthiness probity. Exploiting a set of cross-cultural tax compliance experiments, we find that the average level evasion (as measure dishonesty) does not differ significantly Swedes Italians. However, also uncover national "styles" dishonesty. Specifically, while are more likely to be either completely honest or dishonest their fiscal declarations,...
As shown by the recent crisis, tax evasion poses a significant problem for countries such as Greece, Spain and Italy. While these societies certainly possess weaker fiscal institutions compared to other EU members, might broader cultural differences between northern southern Europe also help explain citizens’ (un)willingness pay their taxes? To address this question, we conduct laboratory experiments in UK Italy, two which straddle North-South divide. Our design allows us examine willingness...
While second-party punishment is suitable in small groups, third-party much more common large societies, where it generally recognized as a social norm enforcement device that may guarantee stability. However, the presence of potential additional punisher who observes violation and decides to intervene becomes probable. The question arises whether would be robust with respect an enlargement pool altruistic punishers, namely introduction second punisher. relevance this evident because, should...
This article provides an experimental investigation of third parties' sanctioning behavior, in order to understand whether public officials (e.g., judges, politicians, or regulators), when deciding about top-down interventions aimed at punishing wrongdoers, are sensitive bottom-up pressure on the part ordinary citizens, who major victims wrongdoers' behavior. We set up a novel five-treatment design and compare situations where wrongdoer acts under: (1) no third-party punishment; (2)...
The aim of this paper is to show how two competitive governments can simultaneously choose their income taxes. There are tiers government in competition. problem analysed using the Leviathan hypothesis and theory incomplete contracts. We assume that a includes its re-election utility function study allocation tax rates between tiers, free from any regulatory constraint. interested meeting constraint, but common interest does not generate an egalitarian revenues.
Abstract This paper analyses, by means of an economic experiment, the impact a vertical review on third-party punishment. Whereas existing empirical literature has studied, under many different aspects, costly punishment as such, it not addressed second “instance” (competent to overrule decisions first punisher) incidence and amount such first-instance underlying unwanted behaviour (“stealing”). In this paper, we apply experimental methodology that allows us construct in lab counterfactual...
When making decisions, people are typically differently sensitive to gains and losses according the motivational context in which choice is performed. As hypothesized by Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT), indeed, goals supposed change relation set of possible outcomes. In particular, a promotion context, goal achieving maximal gain, whereas prevention it turns into avoiding greatest loss. We explored neurophysiological counterpart this phenomenon, applying Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS)...