A5021244182- Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Ethics in Business and Education
- Psychology of Social Influence
- Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Corruption and Economic Development
- Economic Policies and Impacts
- Auction Theory and Applications
- Economic Theory and Institutions
- Free Will and Agency
- Corporate Finance and Governance
- Psychological and Educational Research Studies
- Economic and Technological Developments in Russia
- Genetic Neurodegenerative Diseases
- Mitochondrial Function and Pathology
- scientometrics and bibliometrics research
- Metabolism and Genetic Disorders
ESSCA School of Management
2023
The University of Queensland
2013-2021
Alexander Fleming Biomedical Sciences Research Center
2017
Agricultural University of Athens
2017
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
2015-2016
Compliance to authority is an integral part of how organizations operate. We use experiment show that compliance a cue by powerful motivating mechanism. do this in where there are direct orders or indirect cues destroy half another participant's earnings at cost one's own earnings. Depending on the experimental treatment, up around 60–70% participants decide comply with being provided.
The mitochondrial protein SLC25A46 has been recently identified as a novel pathogenic cause in wide spectrum of neurological diseases, including inherited optic atrophy, Charcot-Marie-Tooth type 2, Leigh syndrome, progressive myoclonic ataxia and lethal congenital pontocerebellar hypoplasia. is an outer membrane protein, member the Solute Carrier 25 (SLC25) family nuclear genes encoding carriers, with role dynamics cristae maintenance. Here we loss-of-function mutation Slc25a46 gene that...
We present an experiment providing (a) a horse race among different models combining social preferences and risk preferences, (b) test of whether agents are socially curious, that is wanting to know about the taking others outcomes their taking. distinguish outcome driven (that is, where care earning for themselves others) from action one's actions relative others). embed competitive inequality aversion, conformism, loss within single theoretical framework generalized Bolton Ockenfels...
Abstract We present a simple principal–agent experiment in which the principals are allowed to choose between revenue‐sharing, bonus, and trust contract, offer an agent. Our findings suggest that large majority of experimental subjects revenue‐sharing contract. This choice turns out be not only most efficient but also, at same time, fair. Overall, distribution earnings is mildly skewed towards principal. conclude that, under contracts, concerns for fairness can closely associated with use...
We investigate experimentally the relationship between risk and incentives in a principal–agent setting. In contrast to existing empirical literature that describes such as 'tenuous' or inconclusive, we find clear negative relationship—supporting prediction of standard theoretical model. Specifically, principals reduce size offered piece rates with an increase instead provide positive fixed wages. Furthermore, no variance performance effort choice agent, strong agents well wage, suggesting...
Abstract We report the results of an experiment on how individual risk taking clusters together when subjects are informed peers’ previous decisions. Subjects asked much their endowment they wish to allocate in a lottery which there is 50% chance amount invest will be tripled and investment lost. use 2 × factorial design varying: (i) whether initially observed high or low social anchors, (ii) information about decisions other group provided. find strong evidence that individuals' malleable...
If principals are allowed to choose between a revenue sharing, bonus and trust contract, large majority of experimental subjects the sharing contract. We find that this choice is most efficient while at same time being fair in Paretian sense on average agents not worse off than other contracts. Furthermore, distribution earnings only mildly skewed towards principal. conclude under contracts concerns for fairness can go hand with use monetary incentives.
We use an experiment to show that conformity a cue by authority, due social image utility towards the is powerful motivating mechanism. do this in where obedience implies destruction of half earnings another subject at cost one’s own earnings. When constant pressure obey applied engage destruction, rate over 40%. Six subjects out ten are willing destroy when more provided specific intervals time, with no need for explicit reason or potential reciprocal aggression.
We report the results of an economic experiment on how social preferences and behavioral imitation lead to clustering investment decisions, even if expected return underlying asset is known. During experiment, subjects are asked much their endowment they wish allocate in which there a 50% chance amount invest will be tripled lost. To study interdependence decisions we use 2 x factorial design varying: (i) whether initially observed high or low anchors, (ii) information about other group...
We analyze linear, weakest-link and best-shot public goods games in which a distinguished team member, the allocator, has property rights over benefits from good can distribute them among members. These allocator are intended to capture natural asymmetries hierarchical teams facing social dilemmas, such as those that exist work teams. Our results show introduction of leads pronounced cooperation both linear public-good games, while it no effect good. The uses her allocation power way...
We analyze linear, weakest-link and best-shot public goods games in which a distinguished team member, the allocator, has property rights over benefits from good can distribute them among members. These allocator are intended to capture natural asymmetries hierarchical teams facing social dilemmas, such as those that exist work teams. Our results show introduction of leads pronounced cooperation both linear public-good games, while it no effect good. The uses her allocation power way...