Holger A. Rau

ORCID: 0000-0003-3382-6127
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About
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Research Areas
  • Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
  • Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Economic and Environmental Valuation
  • Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering
  • Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
  • Game Theory and Applications
  • Auction Theory and Applications
  • Economic Policies and Impacts
  • Ethics in Business and Education
  • COVID-19 Pandemic Impacts
  • Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
  • Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Islamic Finance and Banking Studies
  • Transportation Planning and Optimization
  • Transportation and Mobility Innovations
  • Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
  • Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Sports Analytics and Performance
  • Labor Movements and Unions
  • Microfinance and Financial Inclusion
  • Social and Intergroup Psychology

University of Göttingen
2015-2024

University of Duisburg-Essen
2023

University of Mannheim
2017

Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
2014

Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf
2011-2012

10.1016/j.joep.2017.07.008 article EN Journal of Economic Psychology 2017-07-28

In a step-level public-good experiment, we investigate how the order of moves (simultaneous vs. sequential) and number step levels (one two) affects provision in two-player game. We find that sequential significantly improves payoffs, even though second movers often punish first who give less than half threshold contribution. The additional level—which is not feasible standard Nash equilibrium—leads to higher contributions but does improve lowers payoffs. calibrate parameters Fehr Schmidt’s...

10.1177/0022002714530429 article EN Journal of Conflict Resolution 2014-05-06
Christoph Huber Anna Dreber Jürgen Huber Magnus Johannesson Michael Kirchler and 90 more Utz Weitzel Miguel Abellán Xeniya Adayeva Fehime Ceren Ay Kai Barron Zachariah Berry Werner Bönte Katharina Brütt Muhammed Bulutay Pol Campos‐Mercade Eric Cardella Maria Almudena Claassen Gert Cornelissen Ian Dawson Joyce Delnoij Elif E. Demiral Eugen Dimant Johannes T. Doerflinger Malte Dold Cécile Emery Lenka Fiala Susann Fiedler Eleonora Freddi Tilman Fries Agata Gąsiorowska Ulrich Glogowsky Paul M. Gorny Jeremy D. Gretton Antonia Grohmann Sebastian Hafenbrädl Michel J. J. Handgraaf Yaniv Hanoch Einav Hart Max Hennig Stanton Hudja Mandy Hütter Kyle Hyndman Konstantinos Ioannidis Ozan İşler Sabrina Jeworrek Daniel Jolles Marie Juanchich Raghabendra P. KC Menusch Khadjavi Tamar Kugler Shuwen Li Brian J. Lucas Vincent Mak Mario Mechtel Christoph Merkle Ethan A. Meyers Johanna Möllerström Alexander Nesterov Levent Neyse Petra Nieken Anne‐Marie Nussberger Helena Palumbo Kim Peters Angelo Pirrone Xiangdong Qin Rima-Maria Rahal Holger A. Rau Johannes Rincke Piero Ronzani Yefim Roth Ali Seyhun Saral Jan Schmitz Florian Schneider Arthur Schram Simeon Schudy Maurice E. Schweitzer Christiane Schwieren Irene Scopelliti Miroslav Sirota Joep Sonnemans Ivan Soraperra Lisa Spantig Ivo Steimanis Janina Steinmetz Sigrid Suetens Andriana Theodoropoulou Diemo Urbig Tobias Vorlaufer Joschka Waibel Daniel Woods Ofir Yakobi Onurcan Yılmaz Tomasz Zaleśkiewicz Stefan Zeisberger Felix Holzmeister

Does competition affect moral behavior? This fundamental question has been debated among leading scholars for centuries, and more recently, it tested in experimental studies yielding a body of rather inconclusive empirical evidence. A potential source ambivalent results on the same hypothesis is design heterogeneity-variation true effect sizes across various reasonable research protocols. To provide further evidence whether affects behavior to examine generalizability single study...

10.1073/pnas.2215572120 article EN cc-by Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 2023-05-30

We analyze dictator allocation decisions in an experiment where the recipients have to earn pot be divided with a real-effort task. As move before dictators, their effort resemble first trust game. Depending on recipients’ performance, size of is either high or low. compare this treatment baseline windfall gain and lottery determines size. In treatment, reciprocity cannot play role. find that female dictators show decrease taking-rates significantly treatment. This effect larger when make...

10.2139/ssrn.1698188 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2010-01-01

10.1016/j.jebo.2014.03.013 article EN Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2014-03-28

In a step-level public-good experiment, we investigate how the order of moves (simultaneous vs. sequential) and number step levels (one two) affects provision in two-player game. We find that sequential significantly improves payoffs, even though second movers often punish first who give less than half threshold contribution. The additional level --- which is not feasible standard Nash equilibrium leads to higher contributions but does improve lowers payoffs. calibrate parameters Fehr...

10.2139/ssrn.1763442 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2012-01-01

10.1016/j.jbef.2019.04.002 article EN Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance 2019-04-29

Social dilemmas often impose negative externalities on third parties. We experimentally analyze gender differences in cooperation such a setting, i.e., prisoner's dilemma game, with passive party that may be harmed when active players mutually cooperate. Applying within-subjects we compare under anonymity and social information, as personal characteristics are commonly known real-life relations. Results show the presence of externality particularly affects guilt-averse women, who cooperate...

10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.007 article EN cc-by Games and Economic Behavior 2024-07-15

In this paper, we investigate how payment procedures that are deemed unfair can spur unethical behavior towards innocent coworkers in a real‐effort experiment. our Discrimination treatment, highly procedure with wage differentials, half the workforce is randomly selected and paid by relative performance whereas remaining receives no payment. A joy‐of‐destruction game measures subsequently. Non‐earners destroy significantly more than non‐discriminatory control treatments. , generally high for...

10.1111/ecin.12906 article EN cc-by Economic Inquiry 2020-05-29

Gender differences in university teaching evaluations are well established, showing less favorable assessments of female instructors. It has also been shown that these cannot be linked to students' course performance, which would justify evaluations. The thus either due aspects do not affect student but their class experience (e.g., likability voice tone), or evaluation biases unrelated any actual experience. We find support for the latter mechanism when between instructors excluded by...

10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01074 article EN cc-by Frontiers in Psychology 2020-05-26

Diabetes is an important health burden in Indonesia. However, diabetes management and treatment remain poor, with most people Indonesia not achieving the recommended blood glucose levels. Peer education may have particular potential low-income settings complementing care without being a large additional strain on system. This cluster randomized controlled trial aims to identify effect of implementation peer for patients type 2 diabetes-related outcomes Aceh, Indonesia, which will complement...

10.1186/s13063-019-3656-1 article EN cc-by Trials 2019-09-02

In this paper, we discuss learning behavior and the heterogeneity of subjects' ability to perform in real-effort tasks. Afterwards, present a novel variant Erkal et al.'s (2011) encryption task which aims minimize repeated settings. task, participants encrypt words into numbers. our variant, apply double-randomization mechanism heterogeneity. Existing experiments with tasks find performance increase 12-14% between first second half. By contrast, mitigates down 2% The data show that subjects...

10.2139/ssrn.2503029 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2014-01-01

This paper shows that prior financial incentives induce a crowding‐out effect when are discontinued. In our real‐effort experiment workers receive piece rate before monetary substituted by one‐time payment. this case, workers' performance significantly drops receiving the The is driven fraction of men who reduce effort substantially, whereas women constantly perform well. We find motivational disappears do not have experience rate. series control treatments, we discard several alternative...

10.1111/ecin.12718 article EN Economic Inquiry 2018-09-19

We analyze in a survey study whether economic preferences and pre-crisis social responsibility predict compliance to the policy regulations. Results show that are closely related with policies fighting crisis. Risk tolerance negatively affects citizens' avoidance of crowds, whereas patience helps do so stay home. Present-biased subjects engage panic buying. is fear COVID-19 trust positively resonates positive media perception. Pre-crisis responsible behavior fare evasion, turnout, support...

10.2139/ssrn.3575633 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2020-01-01

In this paper, we analyze how pay-regime procedures affect antisocial behavior at the workplace. a real-effort experiment vary two determinants of pay regimes: discrimination and justification payments by performance. our Discrimination treatment half workforce is randomly selected promoted participate in tournament (high-income workers) whereas other receives no payment (low-income workers). Afterwards, measured Joy-of-Destruction game where participants can destroy canteen vouchers. The...

10.2139/ssrn.2994877 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2017-01-01

This paper experimentally analyzes the role of individual social value orientation (SVO) on honest behavior. We focus a situation where dishonest behavior pays off at somebody else's cost. In which case, distributional preferences might matter for willingness to act honestly. To examine this link we conduct laboratory experiment first elicit SVO measure preferences. Afterwards, implement die rolling game an level. detect positive correlation between subjects' angle and Furthermore, data...

10.2139/ssrn.2837134 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2016-01-01
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