- International Development and Aid
- Political Conflict and Governance
- Economic Sanctions and International Relations
- Corruption and Economic Development
- Economic Growth and Development
- Social Policy and Reform Studies
- Religion, Society, and Development
- Global Peace and Security Dynamics
- Indian Economic and Social Development
- Urban and Rural Development Challenges
- International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Peacebuilding and International Security
- European and International Law Studies
- International Labor and Employment Law
- Human Rights and Immigration
- Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies
- Global trade and economics
- Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
- International Arbitration and Investment Law
- Latin American socio-political dynamics
- Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis
- Urban Planning and Governance
- Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
- Land Rights and Reforms
- Microfinance and Financial Inclusion
Yonsei University
2017-2025
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
2015-2018
Oakland University
2013-2014
The Ohio State University
2010-2014
University of Rochester
2011
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) often seeks to influence countries' domestic public policy via varying levels of conditionality—linking financial support borrowing governments' commitment reforms. When does extensive conditionality encourage economic reforms and when it impede them? We argue that, rather than universally benefiting or harming reforms, the effects stricter IMF depend on partisan politics. More conditions can pressure left‐wing governments into undertaking more ambitious...
Abstract The article explores how International Monetary Fund (IMF) program design influences foreign direct investment inflows. author argues that stricter IMF conditionality signals a program-participating government's commitment to economic reforms, as it incurs larger ex ante political cost and risks greater post cost. Thus, the catalytic effect of an is conditional on conditionality: programs with conditions catalyze more than those less stringent conditions. Empirical analysis dataset...
Does a country’s abuse of human rights influence its ability to get loan from the International Monetary Fund? We examine whether conditions matter for likelihood that country participates in an Fund program. argue are unlikely be enough by themselves decision-making; there simply too many countries with poor under economic distress. Instead, it is publicity and information organizations provide about reduce program participation. test implications this reasoning global analysis 1990 2009...
Abstract The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a human rights mechanism under which all UN members are subject to reviews by other states. Given that North Korea among the worst violators globally, practitioners and academic research have paid much attention as State (SUR). What less known researched actively engages ‘reviewer’, regularly making recommendations members. Using UPR data from 2008 2020, this study explores political dynamics of Korean identifying whom makes why. We theorize...
How do political factors affect foreign aid allocation? Recognizing that can be used as inducement, we argue the US has incentives to provide countries who oppose it a priori at United Nations General Assembly when is sole country “buys votes” with aid, in order maximize number of favorable votes. When there rival trying buy votes, was case during Cold War, are for even those support its position already. We empirically demonstrate provides more hold unfavorable positions only post-Cold War era.
How do International Monetary Fund programs and conditions affect labor rights? Recognizing the diversity of conditionality, we argue that more stringent market conditionality is, worse rights become. However, this negative effect can be mitigated if there exist domestic political institutions have incentives abilities to provide protections over workers: one such case is a closed-list proportional representation system; another leftist government relies on supports workers. Our empirical...
What is the relationship between respect for labor rights and foreign direct investment (FDI)? This study explores this connection with an emphasis on strategic role of governments in attracting FDI. We present a formal model demonstrating that can do so by setting level protection and, as consequence, investors will choose to invest face tough regulations or cease investing, anticipating costs abiding these be too high. The also suggests have incentive implement when enforcement are...
Given similar economic distress indicators, why do some states enter into International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs while others not? Building on extant studies of IMF program participation that highlight the importance various and political determinants, this article proposes an argument focusing incentives a borrowing country when they engage in negotiations. Specifically, study develops domestic politics to interactions among sovereignty costs, competence conditions regime types, tests...
This article first reviews and compares Human Rights Council University Period Review (HRC/UPR) research published during shortly after the institution-building period (2006–2009) to more recent work (2010–2014) identify patterns of scholarly interest in NGO roles behavior at HRC/UPR. It divides into that which either "ignores" NGOs or offers "indirect" attention, "direct" "foregrounds" activity, concluding are surprisingly underexamined, given remarkable new participatory opportunities...
Sanctions are said to fail because of the "rally-round-the-flag effect". This is main reason why many advocate use positive incentives as a viable alternative. Not only do rewards provoke no defensive reaction, but they may elicit rally in support compliance – "fifth-column effect." Yet, vulnerable extortion doing wrong hope obtaining larger rewards. As result, conjecture that sanction threats and promises reward most efficient when used simultaneously. We put this test, staging formal...
What effect do economic sanctions have on the IMF lending decisions? Though countries under often face significant and financial difficulties, no comprehensive research to date has explored whether as a de facto lender of last resort intervenes in those need. We posit that coercion is likely hinder target's access credits sanctioning (sender) are use their political influence deny funds destabilized target economies. To assess empirical merits hypothesis, we combine data with for 120...
Why do some countries participate in IMF programs while others refuse to so? We suggest an answer the question by unpacking one side of typical democracy–autocracy dichotomy. Specifically, we utilize growing literature on varieties authoritarianism develop argument linking different incentives and constraints that leaders party-based, personalist, military regimes face when considering whether sign agreements with IMF. Empirically, demonstrate distinguishing among autocracies uncovers...
Which countries are middle powers in international relations? While the term “middle powers” has witnessed a steady increase its use past two decades, answers to question likely be diverse, depending on whom one asks question. The paper tries provide objective criteria that would allow define entire population of and theorize how different types regarded treated by other countries, most significantly, great powers. Specifically, we contend those with larger potential capability than realized...
We examine the global determinants of illicit international narcotics trade and specific roles that states play in it, a topic understudied by relations scholars. develop first comprehensive data set state involvement trafficking then use to empirically test hypotheses concerning likelihood countries serve as transit for transshipment drugs. find more-globalized are more likely act size economy, well corruption weak rule law, positively related probability acting state. States with stable...
How does official development assistance (ODA) affect women’s rights in aid-receiving countries? We argue that ODA allows those donor countries who have more respect for and the intention of spreading norm gender equality to successfully influence recipient countries, thus improve aid-recipient countries. this is possible because aid equipped with technical assistance, conditionality, donor-recipient collaborative projects can be tailored address a specific policy objective are ripe...
With increased transnational investment activities, multinational firms and states find their interests conflicted decide to litigate disputes in international courts. Given that there are multiple venues settle disputes, which court do governments choose why? We argue investors tend a system maximize interests, thus consider characteristics of the respondent country industries they included. empirically proceed with ICSID rule when countries have less direct control economy home ties weak.
Abstract How do investors respond when a country participates in an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme? While there exists some optimism and around the IMF on catalytic effect of programme, empirical research finance reports rather diverse findings; contrary to most theoretical research, studies report both positive negative effects as well null effects. This paper revisits question whether how programme catalyses other finances, focusing foreign direct investment (FDI). We modify...
Other SectionsAbstract1. INTRODUCTION2. WHO DOMINATES IOS? HEGEMON VERSUS INTERNATIONAL BUREAUCRATS3. ORGANIZATION AS A COMMON AGENT SERVING COLLECTIVE PRINCIPALS4. DECISION MAKING AT THE WORLD BANK5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TWO BANK REFORM CASES6. CONCLUSIONFigureTableReference