A5072358757- Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
- Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies
- Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Energy, Environment, Economic Growth
- Sports Analytics and Performance
- Economic and Environmental Valuation
- Cultural Differences and Values
- Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Interprofessional Education and Collaboration
- Evaluation and Performance Assessment
- Community Health and Development
- Environmental Sustainability in Business
- Global Energy and Sustainability Research
- Advanced Text Analysis Techniques
- Nonprofit Sector and Volunteering
- Energy and Environment Impacts
- Climate Change Communication and Perception
- Climate Change and Geoengineering
- Psychology of Social Influence
- Taxation and Compliance Studies
- Environmental Education and Sustainability
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
2020-2022
Middlesex University
2015-2018
Istanbul Bilgi University
2012-2016
University of Reading
2016
BioReliance (United States)
2009
Universidad de Granada
2009
Experiments using economic games are becoming a major source for the study of human social behavior. These experiments usually conducted with university students who voluntarily choose to participate. Across natural and sciences, there is some concern about how this "particular" subject pool may systematically produce biased results. Focusing on preferences, employs data from survey-experiment representative sample city's population (N = 765). We report behavioral five experimental decisions...
We assess evidence from theoretical-modelling, empirical and experimental studies on how interactions between instruments of climate policy affect overall emissions reduction. Such take the form negative, zero or positive synergistic effects. The considered comprise performance technical standards, carbon pricing, adoption subsidies, innovation support, information provision. Based findings, we formulate climate-policy packages that avoid negative employ synergies, compare their strengths...
Abstract In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split sum of money with responder. If responder rejects proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection unfair offers is regarded as form punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing impose cooperation norm at personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels antisocial competitive, spiteful which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two...
Abundant evidence across the behavioral and social sciences suggests that there are substantial individual differences in pro-social behavior. However, little is known about psychological mechanisms underlie preferences. This paper investigates whether empathy Theory of Mind shape behavior as conventionally observed neutrally framed science experiments. Our results show capacity for do not The qualify role strategic interaction. We only fair individuals exhibit more accurate beliefs others...
Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved collective often considered to have two options: contribute towards a public solution or free-ride. But they might also choose third option investing private such local change adaptation. Here we introduce game featuring wealth inequality caused by luck merit both solutions with participants from 34 countries. We show that joint existence has...
The ultimatum game (UG) is widely used to study human bargaining behavior and fairness norms. In this game, two players have agree on how split a sum of money. proposer makes an offer, which the responder can accept or reject. If rejects, neither player gets anything. prevailing view that, beyond self-interest, desire equalize both players' payoffs (i.e., fairness) crucial motivation in UG. Based view, previous research suggests that short-run oriented motive conflicts with long-run goal...
Levels of trust and trustworthiness have important externalities for the society. But what exactly do these social concepts reflect? Building upon argument that in typical real-life exchanges people act simultaneously as both trustors trustees, we study impact individuals' motives (or preferences) on their choices a dual-role Trust Game (TG). We employ data from large-scale representative experiment (N = 774), where all subjects played roles binary TG with real monetary incentives. Subjects'...
Abstract Is collaboration the fast choice for humans? Past studies proposed that cooperation is a behavioural default, based on Response Times (RT) findings. Here we contend individual’s reckoning of immediate social environment shapes her predisposition to cooperate and, hence, response latencies. In dilemma game, manipulate beliefs about partner’s intentions and show they act as switch determines defection RTs; when intention perceived high, choices are speeded up, while slowed down....
Many risky actions are carried out under the influence of alcohol. However, effect alcoholic intoxication over willingness to take risks is complex and still remains unclear. We conduct an economic field experiment in a natural, drinking risk-taking environment analyze how both actual self-estimated blood alcohol concentration (BAC) levels subjects’ choices monetary lotteries. Our results reveal negative impact BAC on risk-taking. for male young subjects, we find positive relationship...
Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved collective often considered to have two options: contribute towards a public solution or free-ride. But they might also choose third option investing private such local change adaptation. Here we introduce game featuring wealth inequality caused by luck merit both solutions with participants from 34 countries. We show that joint existence has...
<title>Abstract</title> Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change<sup>1–5</sup>. Individuals involved collective often considered to have two options: contribute towards a public solution or free-ride. But they might also choose third option investing private such local change adaptation<sup>6–8</sup>. Here we introduce game featuring wealth inequality caused by luck merit both solutions with participants...
Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved these often considered to have two options: contribute towards public solutions such global mitigation or free ride. However, many collective today involve a third option investing ‘private solution’ local adaptation. Here we introduce game featuring private solutions, wealth inequality determined by luck merit, participants from 34...