A5096170140- Environmental Education and Sustainability
- Cultural Differences and Values
- Online Learning and Analytics
- Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Educational Games and Gamification
- Community Health and Development
- Innovative Teaching and Learning Methods
- Economic and Environmental Valuation
- Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Behavioral Health and Interventions
- Urban Green Space and Health
Universität Innsbruck
2024
Decision Sciences (United States)
2024
Management Center Innsbruck
2024
We investigated whether carbon taxes with and without dividends improve cooperative behavior to mitigate simulated climate change. implemented a randomized controlled trial on large sample of the U.S. general population (N=2,116). Played in real-time groups four, we tested three carbon-pricing treatments baseline condition within modified threshold public goods game loss avoidance. found that tax coupled reduces carbon-emitting group consumption relative no tax, only. A paid out...
Exposure to nature is positively associated with pro-environmental behavior, though causal evidence date limited. We conducted a randomized controlled trial N = 542 participants, explore whether one-time encounter can lead individuals behave more pro-environmentally. Participants were randomly assigned one of four conditions, spending 15 minutes either walking through park, an urban area, viewing video walk, or taking break while seated at desk. received EUR 10 endowment keep for themselves...
We summarize our experience and lessons learned conducting a public goods game online with U.S. sample via Prolific (N=2,116). Our study involved group formation real-time interaction among participants was programmed using oTree. provide insights recommendations for researchers considering experiments simultaneous decision-making (dyadic studies). cover Prolific's sampling speeds, feasibility collecting nationally representative sample, wait pages, hosting, server loads. also the developers of
<title>Abstract</title> Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change<sup>1–5</sup>. Individuals involved collective often considered to have two options: contribute towards a public solution or free-ride. But they might also choose third option investing private such local change adaptation<sup>6–8</sup>. Here we introduce game featuring wealth inequality caused by luck merit both solutions with participants...