Juan-Camilo Cárdenas

ORCID: 0000-0003-0005-7595
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About
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Research Areas
  • Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
  • Economic and Environmental Valuation
  • Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Game Theory and Applications
  • Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management
  • Income, Poverty, and Inequality
  • Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Corruption and Economic Development
  • Agricultural risk and resilience
  • Regional Development and Innovation
  • Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare
  • Auction Theory and Applications
  • Agriculture, Land Use, Rural Development
  • Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics
  • Land Rights and Reforms
  • Environmental Education and Sustainability
  • History and Politics in Latin America
  • Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
  • Social and Intergroup Psychology
  • Latin American socio-political dynamics
  • Community Health and Development
  • Social Capital and Networks
  • Conflict, Peace, and Violence in Colombia

Universidad de Los Andes
2006-2025

Ecolab (United States)
2025

California Institute of Technology
2006-2024

Universidad de Los Andes
2013-2024

University of Massachusetts Amherst
2022-2024

Universidad Centroccidental Lisandro Alvarado
2022

Amherst College
2022

Universidad Libre de Colombia
2017

Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
2000-2016

Universidad Cooperativa de Colombia
2016

Recent behavioral experiments aimed at understanding the evolutionary foundations of human cooperation have suggested that a willingness to engage in costly punishment, even one-shot situations, may be part psychology and key element our sociality. However, because most been confined students industrialized societies, generalizations these insights species necessarily tentative. Here, experimental results from 15 diverse populations show (i) all demonstrate some administer punishment as...

10.1126/science.1127333 article EN Science 2006-06-22

A Fair Society Many of the social interactions everyday life, especially those involving economic exchange, take place between individuals who are unrelated to each other and often do not know other. Countless laboratory experiments have documented propensity subjects behave fairly in these punish participants deemed behaved unfairly. Henrich et al. (p. 1480 , see Perspective by Hoff ) measured fairness thousands from 15 contemporary, small-scale societies gain an understanding evolution...

10.1126/science.1182238 article EN Science 2010-03-18

Abstract Explanations of poverty, growth and development depend on the assumptions made about individual preferences willingness to engage in strategic behaviour. Economic experiments, especially those conducted field, have begun paint a picture economic agents developing communities that is at variance with traditional portrait. We review this growing literature an eye towards preference-related experiments field. also offer lessons what economists might learn from experiments. conclude by...

10.1080/00220380701848327 article EN The Journal of Development Studies 2008-03-01
Kimmo Eriksson Pontus Strimling Michele J. Gelfand Junhui Wu Jered Abernathy and 95 more Charity S. Akotia Alisher Aldashev Per Andersson Giulia Andrighetto Adote Anum Gizem Arıkan Zeynep Aycan Fatémeh Baghérian Davide Barrera Dana Basnight-Brown Birzhan Batkeyev Anabel Belaus Elizaveta Berezina Marie Björnstjerna Sheyla Blumen Paweł Boski Fouad Bou Zeineddine И.Б. Бовина Bui Thi Thu Huyen Juan-Camilo Cárdenas Đorđe Čekrlija Hoon-Seok Choi Carlos C. Contreras‐Ibáñez Rui Costa‐Lopes Mícheál de Barra Piyanjali de Zoysa Angela Rachael Dorrough N.V. Dvoryanchikov Anja Eller Jan B. Engelmann Hyun Euh Xia Fang Susann Fiedler Olivia Foster‐Gimbel Márta Fülöp Ragna B. Garðarsdóttir Colin Mathew Hugues D. Gill Andreas Glöckner Sylvie Graf A. K. Grigoryan Vladimir Gritskov Katarzyna Growiec Peter Haľama Andree Hartanto Tim Hopthrow Martina Hřebı́čková Dzintra Iliško Hirotaka Imada Hansika Kapoor Kerry Kawakami Narine Khachatryan Natalia Kharchenko Ninetta Khoury Toko Kiyonari Michal Kohút Lê Thuỳ Linh Lisa M. Leslie Yang Li Norman P. Li Zhuo Li Kadi Liik Angela T. Maitner Bernardo Manhique Harry Manley Imed Medhioub Sari Mentser Linda Mohammed Pegah Nejat Orlando Júlio André Nipassa Ravit Nussinson Nneoma Gift Onyedire Ike E. Onyishi Seniha Özden Penny Panagiotopoulou Lorena R. Perez‐Floriano Minna Persson Mpho M. Pheko Anna‐Maija Pirttilä‐Backman Marianna Pogosyan Jana L. Raver Cecilia Reyna Ricardo Borges Rodrigues Sara Romanò Pedro Romero Inari Sakki Álvaro San Martín Sara Sherbaji Hiroshi Shimizu Brent Simpson Erna Szabo Kosuke Takemura Hassan Tieffi María Luisa Mendes Teixeira Napoj Thanomkul Habib Tiliouine

Abstract Norm enforcement may be important for resolving conflicts and promoting cooperation. However, little is known about how preferred responses to norm violations vary across cultures domains. In a preregistered study of 57 countries (using convenience samples 22,863 students non-students), we measured perceptions the appropriateness various violation cooperative atypical social behaviors. Our findings highlight both cultural universals variation. We find universal negative relation...

10.1038/s41467-021-21602-9 article EN cc-by Nature Communications 2021-03-05

10.1016/s0304-3878(02)00098-6 article EN Journal of Development Economics 2003-04-01

If individuals will cooperate with cooperators, and punish non-cooperators even at a cost to themselves, then this strong reciprocity could minimize the cheating that undermines cooperation. Based upon numerous economic experiments, some have proposed human cooperation is explained by norm enforcement. Second-party punishment when you someone who defected on you; third-party else. Third-party an effective way enforce norms of promote Here we present new results expand previous report from...

10.1098/rspb.2007.1517 article EN Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences 2007-12-18

Using data from an experiment conducted in 70 Colombian communities, we investigate who pools risk with whom when trust is crucial for enforcing pooling arrangements. We explore the roles played by attitudes and social networks. Both empirically theoretically, find that close friends relatives group assortatively on are more likely to join same group, while unfamiliar participants less rarely assort. These findings indicate where there advantages grouping those may be inaccessible absent or...

10.1257/app.4.2.134 article EN American Economic Journal Applied Economics 2012-04-01

Transformation toward a sustainable future requires an earth stewardship approach to shift society from its current goal of increasing material wealth vision sustaining built, natural, human, and social capital-equitably distributed across society, within among nations. Widespread concern about earth's trajectory support for actions that would foster more pathways suggests potential tipping points in public demand vision. Here, we draw on empirical studies theory show movement can be...

10.1007/s13280-022-01721-3 article EN cc-by AMBIO 2022-04-05

The emergence of COVID-19 dramatically changed social behavior across societies and contexts. Here we study whether norms also changed. Specifically, this question for cultural tightness (the degree to which generally have strong norms), specific (e.g. stealing, hand washing), about enforcement, using survey data from 30,431 respondents in 43 countries recorded before the early stages following COVID-19. Using variation disease intensity, shed light on mechanisms predicting changes norm...

10.1038/s41467-024-44999-5 article EN cc-by Nature Communications 2024-02-16

10.1023/a:1011422313042 article EN Environment Development and Sustainability 2000-01-01

10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.01.008 article EN Journal of Development Economics 2013-01-29

Policy makers use several international indices that characterize countries according to the quality of their institutions. However, no effort has been made study how honesty citizens varies across countries. This paper explores among 16 with 1440 participants. We employ a very simple task where participants face trade-off between joy eating fine chocolate and disutility having threatened self-concept because lying. Despite incentives cheat, we find individuals are mostly honest. Further,...

10.1016/j.jebo.2015.04.020 article EN cc-by-nc-nd Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2015-05-21

Gelcich, S., R. Guzman, C. Rodriguez-Sickert, J. Castilla, and Cárdenas. 2013. Exploring external validity of common pool resource experiments: insights from artisanal benthic fisheries in Chile. Ecology Society 18(3): 2. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-05598-180302

10.5751/es-05598-180302 article EN cc-by Ecology and Society 2013-01-01
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