Ian A. Apperly

ORCID: 0000-0001-9485-563X
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About
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Research Areas
  • Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Autism Spectrum Disorder Research
  • Memory and Neural Mechanisms
  • Categorization, perception, and language
  • Language, Metaphor, and Cognition
  • Face Recognition and Perception
  • Language Development and Disorders
  • Reading and Literacy Development
  • Spatial Cognition and Navigation
  • Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Cultural Differences and Values
  • Neuroendocrine regulation and behavior
  • Educational Strategies and Epistemologies
  • Language and cultural evolution
  • Neurobiology of Language and Bilingualism
  • Functional Brain Connectivity Studies
  • Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Obsessive-Compulsive Spectrum Disorders
  • Cognitive and developmental aspects of mathematical skills
  • Genetics and Neurodevelopmental Disorders
  • Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
  • Social Representations and Identity

University of Birmingham
2016-2025

University of Lausanne
2020

London South Bank University
2017

University of Kent
2017

Google (United States)
2016

University College Birmingham
2013

Aarhus University
2011

University of Alabama at Birmingham
2010

University of Turin
2009

RELX Group (United Kingdom)
2005

The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans' capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests before 3 4 years age (H. Wellman, D. Cross, & J. Watson, 2001; H. Wimmer Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false-belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (K. Onishi R. Baillargeon, 2005; L. Surian, S. Caldi, Sperber, 2007). Nonhuman animals also but can show very complex social behavior (e.g., Call M. Tomasello, 2005). Fluent...

10.1037/a0016923 article EN Psychological Review 2009-01-01

In a series of three visual perspective-taking experiments, we asked adult participants to judge their own or someone else's perspective in situations where both perspectives were either the same different. We found that could not easily ignore what else saw when making self-perspective judgments. This was observed even only required take within block trials (Experiment 2) entire experiment 3), i.e. under conditions which gave clear opportunity adopt strategy ignoring other person's...

10.1037/a0018729 article EN Journal of Experimental Psychology Human Perception & Performance 2010-08-23

The development of theory mind use was investigated by giving a computerized task to 177 female participants divided into five age groups: Child I (7.3-9.7 years); II (9.8-11.4); Adolescent (11.5-13.9); (14.0-17.7); Adults (19.1-27.5). Participants viewed set shelves containing objects, which they were instructed move 'director' who could see some but not all the objects. Correct interpretation critical instructions required director's perspective and only objects that director see. In...

10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00888.x article EN Developmental Science 2009-07-08

Abstract What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs? An obvious possibility is she might these very attitudes as such. It sometimes tacitly or explicitly assumed this the only possible answer. However, we argue several recent discoveries in developmental, cognitive, comparative psychology indicate need for other, less possibilities. Our aim meet by describing construction of a...

10.1111/mila.12036 article EN Mind & Language 2013-10-31

Research on "theory of mind" has traditionally focused a narrow participant group (preschool children) using range experimental tasks (most notably, false-belief tasks). Recent work greatly expanded the age human participants tested to include infants, older children, and adults, devised new tasks, adopted methods from cognitive psychology neuroscience. However, theoretical not kept pace with these changes, result that studies one kind method or often inherit assumptions about nature theory...

10.1080/17470218.2012.676055 article EN Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 2012-04-26

Little is known about the functional and neural architecture of social reasoning, one major obstacle being that we crucially lack relevant tools to test potentially different reasoning components. In case belief previous studies have tried separate processes involved in per se from those processing high incidental demands such as working memory typical tasks. this study, developed new tasks order disentangle, for first time, two perspective taking components reasoning: (i) ability inhibit...

10.1093/brain/awh464 article EN Brain 2005-03-17

Abstract A model of the functional and anatomical basis belief reasoning is essential for understanding relationship between other cognitive processes in both normal development pathology. Studies brain-damaged patients can give valuable insights into nature processing but pose unique methodological problems. The current study addresses these problems by using a nonlinguistic belief-reasoning task with substantially reduced executive demands. case series 12 presented. errors four damage to...

10.1162/0898929042947928 article EN Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 2004-12-01

Two experiments explored whether children's correct answers to counterfactual and future hypothetical questions were based on an understanding of possibilities. Children played a game in which toy mouse could run down either 1 2 slides. found it difficult mark physically both possible outcomes, compared reporting single event, “What if next time he goes the other way …” (Experiment 1: 3–4‐year‐olds 4–5‐year‐olds), or had gone …?” 2: 5–6‐year‐olds). An open question, “Could have anywhere...

10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00879.x article EN Child Development 2006-03-01

Understanding the operating characteristics of theory mind is essential for understanding how beliefs, desires, and other mental states are inferred, role such inferences could play in cognitive processes. We present first investigation automaticity belief reasoning. In an incidental false-belief task, adult subjects responded more slowly to unexpected questions concerning another person's about object's location than real location. Results conditions showed that responses were not...

10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01791.x article EN Psychological Science 2006-10-01

Children (aged 6–10) and adults (total N = 136) completed a novel visual perspective‐taking task that allowed quantitative comparisons across age groups. All groups found it harder to judge the other person’s perspective when differed from their own. This egocentric interference did not decrease with age, even though, overall, performance improved. In addition, was more difficult one’s own of person, suggesting other’s processed though interfered self‐perspective judgments. logically...

10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01730.x article EN Child Development 2012-02-15

Abstract Characterizing the cognitive architecture of human mindreading forces us to address two puzzles in people's attributions belief: Why children show inconsistent expectations about others' belief‐based actions, and why adults' reasoning belief is sometimes automatic not. The seemingly puzzling data suggest that humans have many systems use different models mental representations. efficient system shared by infants, children, adults, uses a minimal model mind, which enables belief‐like...

10.1111/cdep.12183 article EN Child Development Perspectives 2016-05-13

A growing body of work suggests that in some circumstances, humans may be capable ascribing mental states to others a way is fast, cognitively efficient, and implicit (implicit mentalizing hypothesis). However, the interpretation this has recently been challenged by suggesting observed effects reflect "submentalizing" attention memory, with no ascription (submentalizing The present study employed strong test between these hypotheses examining whether apparently automatic processing another's...

10.1037/xhp0000138 article EN Journal of Experimental Psychology Human Perception & Performance 2015-09-21

Keysar et al. (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Keysar, Lin, 2003) report that adults frequently failed to use their conceptual competence for theory of mind (ToM) in an online communication game where they needed take account a speaker's perspective. The current research reports 3 experiments investigating the cognitive processes contributing adults' errors. In Experiments 1 and 2 frequency failure ToM was unaffected by perspective switching. Experiment made more errors when...

10.1080/17470210903281582 article EN Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 2009-10-17

Studies with infants show divergence between performance on theory of mind tasks depending whether direct or indirect measures are used. It has been suggested that assess a flexible but cognitively demanding ability to reason about the minds others, whereas distinct processes which afford more efficient less abilities (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). This leads prediction should be subject signature limits . The current study tested Level‐1/Level‐2 distinction might constitute one such...

10.1111/j.2044-835x.2011.02063.x article EN British Journal of Developmental Psychology 2011-10-14

Neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies implicate both frontal temporoparietal cortices when humans reason about the mental states of others. Here, we report an event-related potentials study time course one such "theory mind" ability: visual perspective taking. The findings suggest that posterior cortex, perhaps calculates represents self versus other, then, later, right cortex resolves conflict between perspectives during response selection.

10.1523/jneurosci.1392-11.2011 article EN cc-by-nc-sa Journal of Neuroscience 2011-09-07
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