Nathan M. Jensen

ORCID: 0000-0002-3251-8117
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About
Contact & Profiles
Research Areas
  • International Development and Aid
  • Local Government Finance and Decentralization
  • Corruption and Economic Development
  • Taxation and Compliance Studies
  • Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth
  • Corporate Taxation and Avoidance
  • State Capitalism and Financial Governance
  • International Arbitration and Investment Law
  • Global trade and economics
  • International Business and FDI
  • Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
  • Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
  • Global Financial Crisis and Policies
  • Electoral Systems and Political Participation
  • Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Policy and Reform Studies
  • Economic Policies and Impacts
  • Agricultural risk and resilience
  • Mining and Resource Management
  • Political Conflict and Governance
  • Innovation and Knowledge Management
  • Natural Resources and Economic Development
  • Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance
  • Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Auction Theory and Applications

Stanford University
2024

The University of Texas at Austin
2016-2021

New York Proton Center
2020

New York University Press
2020

George Washington University
2015-2016

Washington University in St. Louis
2006-2015

Columbia University
2015

Brookings Institution
2013

Institute of Criminology
2013

University of Cambridge
2013

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important element of the global economy and a central component economic development strategies both developed developing countries. Numerous scholars theorize that benefits attracting multinational corporations come at tremendous political costs, arguing democratic systems attract lower levels international than their authoritarian counterparts. Using cross-sectional time-series tests determinants FDI for more 100 countries, I generate results are...

10.1017/s0020818303573040 article EN International Organization 2003-01-01

Political economists point to the levels of economic development, poverty, and income inequality as most important determinants political regimes. The authors present empirical evidence suggesting a robust negative correlation between presence sizable natural resource sector level democracy in Africa. They argue that abundance not only is an determinant democratic transition but also partially determines success consolidation results illuminate fact post-Cold War reforms have been successful...

10.1177/0010414004266867 article EN Comparative Political Studies 2004-09-01

There is a renewed interest in how political risk affects multinational corporations operating emerging markets. Much of this research has focused on the relationship between democratic institutions and flows foreign direct investment (FDI). Yet existing studies suffer from data problems that only allow for indirect evidence risk. In paper I utilize price insurance agencies to directly test domestic affect premiums multinationals pay coverage against government expropriations contract...

10.1017/s0022381608081048 article EN The Journal of Politics 2008-09-15

List of Illustrations ix Preface xi Abbreviations xv Chapter 1: Introduction 1 2: Multinational Firms and Domestic Governments 23 3: Theory 40 4: The Race to the Bottom Thesis FDI 53 5: Democracy 72 6: Veto Players 100 7: IMF Inflows 129 8: Conclusion 146 Notes 157 References 167 Index 185

10.5860/choice.43-6653 article EN Choice Reviews Online 2006-07-01

In this paper, we analyze whether International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality is exclusively designed to be in line with observable economic indicators or it partly driven by the IMF's major shareholder, United States. A panel data analysis of 206 letters intent from 38 countries, submitted during period April 1997 through February 2003, revealed that number conditions on an IMF loan depended a borrowing country’s voting pattern UN General Assembly. Closer allies States (and other Group...

10.1086/508311 article EN The Journal of Law and Economics 2007-02-01

In this paper we analyze whether IMF conditionality is exclusively designed in line with observable economic indicators or, alternatively, it partly driven by its major shareholder, the US. A panel data analysis of 206 letters intent from 38 countries over period 4/1997-2/2003 reveals that number conditions on an loan depends a borrowing country’s voting pattern UN General Assembly. Closer allies United States (and other G7 countries) receive loans fewer especially prior to elections. These...

10.3929/ethz-a-005104885 article EN SSRN Electronic Journal 2005-12-01

In this article we explore the relationship between investments of multinational corporations (foreign direct investment) and income inequality in Mexico. We argue that Mexico's liberalization foreign investment (FDI) inflows 1990s provides a natural experiment to test how FDI affects middle-income country. use an instrumental variables approach as our identification strategy mitigate problems endogeneity omitted variable bias. empirical determinants changes from 1990 2000, find increased...

10.1017/s0020818307070178 article EN International Organization 2007-07-01

Strategy research often aims to empirically establish a causal relationship between an independent variable and dependent such as firm performance. For many important strategy questions, however, traditional empirical techniques are not sufficient effects with high confidence. We propose that field experiments have potential be used more widely in research, leveraging methodological innovations from other disciplines address persistent puzzles the literature. first review advantages...

10.1002/smj.2449 article EN Strategic Management Journal 2015-10-05

There is a growing literature on how natural resources affect both economic performance and political regimes. In this article the authors add to by focusing resource wealth affects incentives of governments uphold contracts with foreign investors across all sectors. They argue that although states suffer reputation costs from reneging contracts, in natural-resource-dependent economies are less sensitive these costs, leading greater probability expropriation contract disputes. Specifically,...

10.1177/0010414011401208 article EN Comparative Political Studies 2011-05-16

A strong statistical association between legislative opposition in authoritarian regimes and investment has been interpreted as evidence that legislatures constrain executive decisions reduce the threat of expropriation. Although empirical relationship is robust, scholars have not provided systematic parliaments are able to restrain actions state leaders, reverse activities they disagree with, or remove leaders who violate implied power-sharing arrangement. This article shows legislatures,...

10.1017/s0007123412000774 article EN British Journal of Political Science 2013-04-10

Prevailing work argues that foreign investment reduces corruption, either by competing down monopoly rents or diffusing best practices of corporate governance. We argue the mechanisms generating this relationship are not clear because extant empirical is too heavily drawn from aggregations total entering an economy. Alternatively, we suggest openness to has differential effects on corruption even within same country and under domestic institutions over time. firms use bribes enter protected...

10.1111/ajps.12126 article EN American Journal of Political Science 2014-09-11

Much political science scholarship, including important work in this journal, has explored the implications of natural resource endowments— particularly oil and other highly valuable export commodities—on economic outcomes. Although first wave literature emphasized negative effects these resources, more recent emphasizes how domestic institutions can condition relationship, sometimes leading to positive effects. In special issue, authors expand two ways. First, they renew attention on...

10.1177/0010414011401207 article EN Comparative Political Studies 2011-04-18

10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.10.002 article EN European Journal of Political Economy 2012-11-13

Abstract International relations scholarship has made great progress on the study of compliance with international agreements. While persuasive, most this work focused states’ de jure decisions, largely excluding facto behavior nonstate actors whose actions agreement hopes to constrain. Of particular interest been whether OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC) might reduce propensity multinational corporations (MNCs) bribe officials in host countries through its mechanisms extraterritoriality...

10.1017/s0020818317000443 article EN International Organization 2017-11-16

In 2015, Comparative Political Studies embarked on a landmark pilot study in research transparency the social sciences. The editors issued an open call for submissions of manuscripts that contained no mention their actual results, incentivizing reviewers to evaluate based theoretical contributions, designs, and analysis plans. three papers this special issue are result process began with 19 submissions. article, we describe rationale pilot, expressly articulating practices preregistration...

10.1177/0010414016655539 article EN Comparative Political Studies 2016-07-05

A selection model for 68 countries between 1970 and 1998 is used to test the impact of International Monetary Fund(IMF) programs on international capital markets examine how agreements are perceived by multinational investors. Results reveal that even after controlling factors lead seek IMF support, lower levels foreign direct investment (FDI). Countries sign agreements, ceteris paribus, attract 25% less FDI inflows than not under agreements.

10.1177/0022002703262860 article EN Journal of Conflict Resolution 2004-04-01

Agricultural trade protectionism in developed countries remains a politically charged issue, yet few studies have attempted to explain the political dynamics behind this important issue. We consider agricultural subsidies as type of distributive policy that targets sector at expense consumers and taxpayers. Based on Cox (1987, 1990) Myerson (1993), we argue electoral systems encourage politicians appeal narrow constituency tend higher level support. test theoretical hypothesis using OECD...

10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00253.x article EN American Journal of Political Science 2007-03-22

Both countries and subnational governments commonly engage in competition for mobile capital, offering generous incentives to attract investment. Existing economics research has suggested that these tax have a limited ability affect investment patterns are often excessively costly when measured against the amount of jobs created. In this paper, we argue instead "competition" capital can be politically beneficial incumbent politicians. Building off work on electoral pandering, allow...

10.1111/isqu.12106 article EN International Studies Quarterly 2013-12-06

Little is known about the political repercussions of banking crises despite extensive literature on link between economic performance and outcomes. We develop a theory how clarity responsibility affects incumbent party survival patterns in 89 democracies 1975 2005. Our results are robust to modeling strategies that include hazard models with shared frailties account for country-specific factors affect survival. find globalization weakens accountability politicians voters. Incumbents...

10.1177/0010414013488559 article EN Comparative Political Studies 2013-05-29

Abstract Government economic development programmes provide opportunities for firms to leverage financial incentives business expansion and relocation. This article examines the ability of these promote employment. Using establishment-level data from state Kansas as well original firm-level survey data, I evaluate effectiveness in creating jobs through recipient firms. My findings indicate that incentive have no discernable impact on firm expansion, measured by job creation. In addition,...

10.1017/s0143814x16000039 article EN Journal of Public Policy 2016-03-29
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