A5073681726- Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
- Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
- Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
- COVID-19 epidemiological studies
- Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Game Theory and Applications
- Complex Network Analysis Techniques
- Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis
- Machine Learning in Bioinformatics
- SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 Research
- Fractal and DNA sequence analysis
- Viral Infections and Outbreaks Research
- RNA and protein synthesis mechanisms
- Pharmaceutical and Antibiotic Environmental Impacts
- Cellular Automata and Applications
- Genomics and Phylogenetic Studies
- Bacteriophages and microbial interactions
- Plant and animal studies
- Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Antibiotic Resistance in Bacteria
- Artificial Immune Systems Applications
- Cancer Cells and Metastasis
- Genetic and Kidney Cyst Diseases
Dalian University of Technology
2016-2025
Shanghai Children's Medical Center
2022-2024
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
2022-2024
Dalian Minzu University
2023
Shanghai Clinical Research Center
2022
Dalian University
2006-2022
Sun Yat-sen University
2010-2011
Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hospital
2010
A model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with finite population size $N+M$ was built. Among these individuals, $N$ individuals update strategies aspiration updating, while the other $M$ imitation updating. In proposed model, we obtain expression mean fraction cooperators and analyze some concrete cases. Compared standard dynamics, there is always a positive probability to support formation cooperation in system rules. Moreover, numerical results indicate that more aspiration-driven...
When the number of cooperators does not reach collective target, resulting in risk social dilemma, self-organizing behavior group leads to loss interest and government intervention increase interest. For these two situations, we study evolution cooperation under threshold public goods game well-mixed population. The results show that introduction makes it possible generate complex dynamics with interior equilibria replication equation. behavior, increasing is a double-edged sword. Although...