A5079147959- Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Risk Perception and Management
- Climate Change and Geoengineering
- Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Philosophy and History of Science
- Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Free Will and Agency
- Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life
- Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Income, Poverty, and Inequality
- Health and Conflict Studies
- Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms
- Climate Change Policy and Economics
- Disaster Management and Resilience
- Jury Decision Making Processes
- Economic Theory and Institutions
- Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Economic and Environmental Valuation
- Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Space Science and Extraterrestrial Life
- Economic, financial, and policy analysis
Stockholm University
2015-2025
Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study
2020-2024
Institute for Futures Studies
2016-2024
University of Copenhagen
2018-2019
London School of Economics and Political Science
2013-2015
Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme
2015
The Repugnant Conclusion is an implication of some approaches to population ethics. It states, in Derek Parfit's original formulation, For any possible at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality life, there must be much larger imaginable whose existence, if other things are equal, would better, even though its members have lives that barely worth living. (Parfit 1984: 388)
Abstract Considerations of dynamic inconsistency have figured prominently in debates over the rationality preferences that violate separability conditions characteristic expected utility theory. These mostly focused on risk- and ambiguity averse preferences, but analogous considerations apply to for fairness. We revisit these context a specific hypothesis regarding violations by such namely they are potentially both explained rationalised non-instrumental attitudes chances various...
Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true (or false), its chance of should be a matter practical indifference. The aim this article to examine whether requirement rationality. We prove that given Neutrality, Principal Principle entails called Linearity; centerpiece von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. With in mind, we argue rationality but Linearity not and, hence, rationally required.
This paper defends two related claims about belief: first, the claim that, unlike numerical degrees of belief, comparative beliefs are primitive and psychologically real; and, second, that fundamental norm Probabilism is not belief should satisfy probability axioms, but rather certain constraints.
According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are be explained terms agent's desires about concrete outcomes. The orthodoxy has been criticized both for conflating two types attitudes and committing agents that do not seem rationally required. To avoid these problems, it suggested an should captured by a function is independent her utility probability functions. main problem with approach suggests wholly distinct from people's (non-instrumental) desires....
Abstract The precautionary principle (PP) is an influential of risk management. It has been widely introduced into environmental legislation, and it plays important role in most international agreements. Yet, there little consensus on precisely how to understand formulate the principle. In this article I prove some impossibility results for two plausible formulations PP as a decision‐rule. These illustrate difficulty making consistent with acceptance any tradeoffs between catastrophic risks...
The Desire-as-Belief thesis (DAB) states that any rational person desires a proposition exactly to the degree she believes or expects be good. Many people take David Lewis have shown inconsistent with Bayesian decision theory. However, as we show, Lewis's argument was based on an Invariance condition itself is (standard formulation of the) version theory he assumed in his arguments against DAB. aim this paper explore what impact rejection has DAB thesis. Without assuming Invariance, first...
The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by could have been. Preferences based on such value dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes generate a class problems for orthodox decision theory, the best-known perhaps being so-called Allais paradox. In this article we solve these extending Richard Jeffrey's theory to prospects, using multidimensional possible-world semantics conditionals, showing that preferences are sensitive considerations can still be...
Offsetting is a very ineffective way to do good. your lifetime emissions may increase aggregated life expectancy by at most seven years, while giving the amount it costs offset malaria charity saves in expectation of least one child. Is there any moral reason rather than some that does good so much more effectively? There might be such if offsetting compensated or somehow benefitted victims emission, since could mean you would satisfy duty not harm others emitting and offsetting. But...
Abstract Bartha and DesRoches (Synthese 199(3–4):8701–8740, 2021) Steel (Risk Analysis 43(2):260–268, 2023) argue that we should understand the precautionary principle as injunction to maximise lexical utilities. They show utility model has important pragmatic advantages. Moreover, theoretical advantage of satisfying all axioms expected theory except continuity. In this paper I raise a trilemma for any attempt at modelling with utilities: it permits choice cycles or leads paralysis implies...
Abstract: This paper develops a Multidimensional Decision Theory and argues that it better captures ordinary intuitions about fair distribution of chances than classical decision theory. The theory is an extension Richard Jeffrey’s to counterfactual prospect form Modal Consequentialism , according which the value actual outcomes often depends on what could have been. Unlike existing versions modal consequentialism, multidimensional allows us explicitly model desirabilistic dependencies...
Abstract Population axiology concerns how to rank populations by the relation “is socially preferred to”. So far, population ethicists have (with important exceptions) focused less on question of prospects, that is, alternatives contain uncertainty as which they will bring about. Most public policy choices, however, are decisions under uncertainty, including choices affect size a (such climate choices). Here, we shall address prospects We start illustrating well-known axiologies can be...
Most people at some point in their lives face transformative decisions that could result experiences are radically different from any they have had, and change personalities preferences. For instance, most make the conscious decision to either become or not parents. In a recent but already influential book, L. A. Paul (2014) argues choices cannot be rational – or, more precisely, if one assumes what sees as cultural paradigm for decision-making. arrives this surprising conclusion due her...
According to the class of de minimis decision principles, risks can be ignored (or at least treated very differently from other risks) if risk is sufficiently small. In this article, we argue that a threshold has no place in normative theory making, because application principle will either recommend ignoring should not (e.g., sure death person) or it cannot used by ordinary bounded and information-constrained agents.
Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described as conservative change from one probabilistic belief or credence function to another in response new information. Roughly: ‘Hold fixed any credences that are not directly affected by the experience.’ This is precisely articulated case when we learn some proposition had previously entertained indeed true (the rule of conditionalization). But can this conservative-change extended revising one’s entertaining propositions...
This paper discusses a challenge for comparativists about belief, who hold that numerical degree of belief (in particular, subjective probability) is useful fiction, unlike comparative which they regard as real. The to make sense claims like 'I am twice confident in A B' terms only. After showing at least some can meet this challenge, I discuss implications Zynda's [2000] and Stefánsson's [2017] defences comparativism.
Abstract The veil of ignorance argument was used by John C. Harsanyi to defend Utilitarianism and Rawls the absolute priority worst off. In a recent paper, Lara Buchak revives argument, uses it an intermediate position between Harsanyi’s Rawls’ that she calls Relative Prioritarianism. None these authors explore implications allowing agent’s behind are sensitive ambiguity. Allowing for aversion ambiguity—which is both most commonly observed seemingly reasonable attitude ambiguity—however...
Abstract This paper presents a new kind of problem in the ethics distribution. The takes form several ‘calibration dilemmas’, which intuitively reasonable aversion to small-stakes inequalities requires leading theories distribution recommend unreasonable large-stakes inequalities. We first lay out series such dilemmas for prioritarian theories. then consider widely endorsed family egalitarian views and show that they are subject even more forceful calibration than Finally, we our results...
Barry and Cullity argue that when morally assessing a person's climate actions, we should ask how these actions affect other people's prospects, understood in terms of the actor's episemic probabilities. In this comment argue, first, even though are right use epistemic probabilities her it is not clear their conclusion follows. The reason important questions remain about what be object Second, emitting offsetting analogous to drawing from one 'harm' bag 'benefit' has option neither bag.